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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a theoretical model as a foundation of empirical analysis of 
the transmission channel of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank cost of capital, 
credit and liquidity creation in the Eurozone. Empirical results  F R Q I L U P  W K H  P R G H O ¶ V 
predictions and suggest that holding non-performing loans increases the cost of 
capital for banks in the short-term and the long-term. Moreover, the increased cost 
of capital reduces credit and liquidity creation, and the more so the less capitalized 
is the bank. This phenomenon is found to be economically more significant for 
European periphery country banks than for core country banks. The identification 
of the transmission channel is robust to the Granger predictability test.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
A key legacy of the 2008 economic crisis was the accumulation of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in the banking industry operating in the Eurozone. The growth of impaired loans was 
comparatively sharper for banks operating in the Eurozone periphery countries than for banks 
in the Eurozone core countries. Bear in mind that NPLs can be treated as observable 
information since European banks usually release their balance sheets on regular basis. At the 
 E D Q N   O H Y H O    H T X L W \   L Q Y H V W R U V   P L J K W   Z H O O   F D V W   G R X E W V   R Q   W K H   Y L D E L O L W \   R I   W K H   E D Q N ¶ V   E X V L Q H V V 
model, on future profitability and assets values. Moreover, to the extent that  1 3 / V ¶ 
performance is driven by the state of the economy, that is by aggregate risk,  investors will 
require relatively higher returns on equity investment in banks holding NPLs as a compensation 
for undiversifiable risk, implying that the greater the volume of NPLs the bank carries the 
higher its cost of capital. Bank capital serves as a buffer to absorb possible bank losses and 
avoid bankruptcy or simply restructuring processes. Indeed, a bank can control its default 
probability by limiting risk-taking, e.g., by restricting lending and liquidity creation, and/or by 
increasing capital via equity issuance.  
We develop a theoretical model along these lines and use its predictions to address empirically 
two main questions. Firstly, we examine whether, as predicted by the theoretical model, NPLs 
foster  H T X L W \   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶   U H T X L U H G   U H W X U Q V   D Q G   K H Q F H the bank  ¶ V cost of capital. Secondly, we 
analyse whether the cost of capital impacts negatively on credit expansion and liquidity 
creation, and if these effects are exacerbated by shortage of bank capital. Our empirical results 
suggest that NPLs increase the cost of capital for banks both in the short-term and in the long-
term, and this impacts negatively on lending and liquidity creation. Whilst previous research 
has focused on the deleterious impact of NPLs on book value of bank capital, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is one of the first to analyse the impact of NPLs on bank cost of capital. 
Interestingly, we do find that bank leverage enhances the sensitivity of lending and liquidity 
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creation to the bank  ¶ V cost of capital, which means that the lending volume granted by banks 
endowed with relatively higher levels of capital is less affected by  F K D Q J H V   L Q   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶ 
required return on bank equity holdings.  
Importantly, taking into consideration that European periphery country banks accumulated 
comparatively greater levels of NPLs than European core country banks, we estimate 
 V H S D U D W H O \   W K H   W U D Q V P L V V L R Q   F K D Q Q H O   I R U   E R W K   µ ( X U R S H V ¶    : H   I L Q G that this phenomenon is 
economically more significant for banks operating in the Eurozone periphery countries than 
for those in the Eurozone core countries.  
The robustness of our results is validated by repeating the experiment for a sub-sample of 
German banks. Note the reader that German banks were commonly considered to be the safest 
ones in the Eurozone, because they held the lowest levels of NPLs compared to banks in other 
countries, and Germany has been more immune from macro/crisis shocks. Since we obtain 
qualitatively similar estimates for German banks, we draw the conclusion that our results are 
not driven by hidden common factors. Finally, the Granger predictability test confirms the 
uniqueness of the direction of the transmission channel. These results confirm the theoretical 
foundations of the transmission channel under investigation.  
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1. Introduction  
The level of non-performing loans (NPLs hereafter) were relatively stable until the beginning 
of the 2008 financial crisis. Afterwards, the  T X D O L W \   R I   E D Q N V ¶   S R U W I R O L R   K D V   S U R J U H V V L Y H O \ 
declined. The response of national governments and central banks to deal with impaired bank 
assets, recapitalizing and / or restructuring troubled banks were significant in Europe and the 
United States (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015, 2016). At the time of writing this article, large 
 V W R F N V  R I  1 3 / V  R Q  W K H  E D Q N V ¶  E D O D Q F H  V K H H W V  F R Q W L Q X H  W R  Z H L J K W  R Q  S U R I L W D E L O L W \   W R  W L H  X S  E D Q N 
capital, to raise funds and to threaten financial stability (Aiyar et al., 2017). The official 
statistics reveal that the problem of NPLs is concentrated in the so-called European periphery 
countries: in December 2016 Greek banks accumulated around 45.86 percent of NPLs over 
total gross loans, Portugal around the 19.52 percent, Italy around 15.30 percent, Ireland around 
13.57 percent, and Spain around 5.71 percent (see, ESRB 2017; Mansilla-Fernández, 2017, pp. 
33). At the bank level, large volume of NPLs could  F D V W   G R X E W V   R Q   W K H   Y L D E L O L W \   R I   W K H   E D Q N ¶ V 
business model and its resilience on future downturns, thus increasing uncertainties about 
future profitability and asset values. Consequently, adverse market perceptions lead to 
increases in the cost of funding for the overall banking sector (ESRB, 2017). The core question 
of this study is whether NPLs impact on the cost of capital in the short-term and the long-term. 
The key observation is that NPLs performance is driven by the state of the economy, i.e. by 
aggregate risk, and investors require a compensation for aggregate/undiversifiable risk. We 
then extend the analysis by examining the effects of the cost of capital on lending supply and 
liquidity creation. This allows to enlighten the transmission channel of NPLs on credit and 
liquidity provision. 
To perform our empirical analysis, we rely on a unique sample that contains the universe of 
the Eurozone listed banks from Bureau van Dijk ¶ V   % D Q N V F R S H   D Q G   2 U E L V   % D Q N   ) R F X V    D Q G 
market information from Thomson Reuters Datastream, consisting in 225 listed banks for the 
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period 2002Q1-2016Q4. We employ the NPLs ratio to measure the weight of impaired loans 
over the volume of granted loans at the bank level. Importantly, the cost of capital is measured 
as the  P D U N H W ¶ V required return on bank equity; a linear combination of the yield on the 10-
years bund, the  E D Q N ¶ V Beta CAPM and the expected risk premium (ERP hereafter). Following 
previous studies, we measure lending supply as the proportion of credit to customers over 
 E D Q N ¶ V  W R W D O  D V V H W V   Z K L O V W  O L T X L G L W \  F U H D W L R Q  L V  F R P S X W H G  I R O O R Z L Q J  % H U J H U  D Q G  % R Z P D Q         
and Berger et al. (2016) methodology. We test the transmission channel by estimating an 
autoregressive distribution lags (ADL hereafter) model that allows us to assess the evolution 
of the impacts period-by-period towards the steady-state.  
This article is related to the following three strands of the financial literature. The main 
question raised in this study is whether banks holding certain levels of NPLs might face higher 
cost of capital over time. So far, previous literature has analysed the causes of NPLs as a result 
of  E D Q N V ¶ under-capitalization and moral hazard issues. The current advances on banking 
regulation has considerably tightened the minimum capital requirements and the standard of 
provisioning expected credit losses for the recognition of impairments (IFRS-9 accounting 
rule)   7 K H  U R O H  R I  E D Q N ¶ V  F D S L W D O  K D V  E H H Q  F R Q V L G H U H G  D V  D  F R U Q H U V W R Q H  R I  W K H  V W D Q G D U G  W K H R U \  R Q 
banking regulation since it decides the levels of lending that a bank could supply (Caprio and 
Summers, 1993; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). In particular, the so-called moral hazard 
hypothesis  S U H G L F W V  W K D W  W U R X E O H G  E D Q N ¶ V  P D Q D J H U V  Z R X O G  E H  Z L O O L Q J  W R  L Q F U H D V H  W K H  U L V N L Q H V V  R I 
 W K H L U   S R U W I R O L R   L Q   D   µ  J D P E O H   W R   U H V X U U H F W L R Q ¶    % H U J H U   D Q G   ’ H < R X Q J             $ V   D   U H V X O W    W K L V 
strategy will be prone to grant credit to low-scored borrowers, and later on it will increase again 
the volume of NPLs (Bowman and Malmendier, 2015; Buchner and Wagner, 2017; Eisdorfer, 
2008; Koudstaal and Wijnbergen, 2012; Schivardi et al., 2017). In oth  H U  Z R U G V   E D Q N V ¶  T X D O L W \ 
portfolio may endogenously generate further risk-taking, since NPLs above a threshold may 
incentivize banks to shift risk (Bernanke and Gelter, 1986; Caballero et al., 2008; Peek and 
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Rosengren, 2005).1 Nowadays, the literature is devoting growing attention to the repercussions 
 R I   1 3 / V   R Q   E D Q N V ¶   O H Q G L Q J    D Q G   X W W H U O \   R Q   W K H   U H D O   V H F W R U.  We contribute to the existent 
literature by demonstrating that NPLs increase the cost of capital for banks both in the short-
term and in the long-term, and this impacts negatively on lending and liquidity creation.  These 
results are robust to false positive / negative tests performed by repeating the experiment on 
the German listed banks.2 Whilst previous research has focused on the deleterious impact of 
NPLs on book value of bank capital, to the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first 
to analyse the impact of NPLs on bank cost of capital.  
In a second step, we investigate to what extent the cost of capital may affect liquidity 
creation (also called maturity transformation) and lending supply. Addressing this question is 
worthy of research. Following Basel III, banks planning to increase their credit basis are 
required to issue equity to meet the capitalization standards. Moreover, banks are concerned to 
limit the probability of bankruptcy, or simply of restructuring processes. Indeed, a bank can 
control its default probability by limiting risk-taking, e.g., by restricting lending and liquidity 
creation, and/or by increasing capital via equity issuance. If the cost of capital becomes 
relatively greater, the bank is expected not to generate neither new lending and nor transform 
maturity.3 Closely related to our paper, Accornero et al. (2017) demonstrate that NPLs follow 
 D   µ G \ Q D P L F ¶   W U D Q V P L V V L R Q   P H F K D Q L V P   W K D W   D I I H F W V   W K H   V X S S O \   R I   F U H G L W    7 K H \   I L Q G   W K D W 
                                                          
1 Several authors advocate that bank size and the too-big-to-fail (TBTF hereafter) problem represents another 
channel through which banks may generate NPLs (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Cai et al., 
2018). In particular, TBTF banks may assume excessive levels of risk by taking advantage of their market power 
position since market disciple is not imposed by creditors. Accordingly, Louzis et al. (2012) show that the TBTF 
hypothesis is demonstrable depending on loan categories.  
2 We consider that the robustness of our results would be more powerful tested on the German listed banks, since 
they hold lower levels of NPLs than the others. Consequently, they are perceived as relatively safer banks than 
others headquartered in different countries. Note the reader that if the transmission channel is found to work in 
 E D Q N L Q J   P D U N H W V  Z L W K  O R Z  O H Y H O V   D Q G  Y D U L D W L R Q V   R I  1 3 / V   W K H  H [ L V W H Q F H  R I  W K H  µ W K H R U H W L F D O ¶  P H F K D Q L V P  P L J K W  E H 
demonstrated regardless the origin of the bank.  
3 Assessing the threshold from which high levels of NPLs become deleterious is still an open question. Zhang et 
 D O                 I R U  D  V D P S O H  R I  & K L Q H V H  E D Q N V   G H P R Q V W U D W H  W K H  H [ L V W H Q F H  R I  D  W K U H V K R O G  µ H I I H F W ¶  R I           L Q  W K H  1 3 / V 
ratio. They corroborate that banks holding ratios above this threshold will behave according to the moral hazard 
hypothesis, then suffering ulterior losses in the long-term.  
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adjustments in the book value of capital (measured through the Asset Quality Review) have 
 Q H J D W L Y H  H I I H F W V  R Q  E D Q N  O H Q G L Q J   V L P L O D U O \  W R  Q H J D W L Y H  V K R F N V  W R  E D Q N ¶ V capital buffers. In other 
words, increasing trends in NPLs have negative implications for capital buffers, which might 
lastly reduce credit supply (Berger and Bowman, 2013; Dagher et al., 2014; Van der Heuvel, 
2008).4 By running the ADL estimator for the cost of capital, our results demonstrate that the 
increased cost of capital reduces lending supply and liquidity creation in the short-term and the 
long-term. Interestingly, we do find that bank leverage enhances the sensitivity of lending and 
liquidity creation to the bank cost of capital, which means that the lending volume granted by 
 E D Q N V  H Q G R Z H G  Z L W K  U H O D W L Y H O \  K L J K H U  O H Y H O V  R I  F D S L W D O  L V  O H V V  D I I H F W H G  E \  F K D Q J H V  L Q  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶ 
required return on bank equity holdings. 
Importantly, our analysis also takes into consideration possible endogeneity problems 
derived from adverse macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Angelini et al., 2017; Ghosh, 2017; 
Lakdawala et al., 2017) and the sovereign debt crisis, the so- F D O O H G   µ V R Y H U H L J Q- E D Q N   Q H [ X V ¶ 
(e.g., Altavilla et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2016; Li and Zinna, 2014; Podstawski and Velinov, 
2018).5 In some countries, the crisis has been originated in banks, and afterwards transmitted 
to governments, the so- F D O O H G   µ  , U L V K   V W \ O H ¶   F U L V L V  In others, sovereign finances have induced 
 I U D J L O L W \   L Q   E D Q N V ¶   E D O D Q F H   V K H H W    W K H   V R-  F D O O H G   µ  * U H H N   V W \ O H ¶   F U L V L V  Overall, the crisis has 
threatened the solvency of the Eurozone banks via mark-to-market losses in European 
periphery sovereign bonds holdings.6 The Brunnermeier et al. (2011) seminal paper 
demonstrates that sovereign risk exposures are a source of financial instability for the banking 
                                                          
4 Recent authors demonstrate that high levels of NPLs might deteriorate creditworthiness and reduce the demand 
for credit (Accornero et al., 2017; Balgova et al., 2016; Bending et al., 2014; Cuccinelli, 2015). 
5  7 K H   . D P L Q V N \   D Q G   5 H L Q K D U W ¶ V               V H P L Q D O   S D S H U   K L J K O L J K W V   W K D W   L Q F U H D V L Q J   O H Y H O V   R I   1 3 / V   R I W H Q   D U L V H V   D V   D 
consequence of banking crises, but both are the result of the economic downturns that dampen simultaneously the 
banking sector and the real economy.  
6 See Caporin et al. (2018), Paniagua et al. (2017) and Reusens and Croux (2017) for a profound exploration of 
the determinants of sovereign debt spread between periphery and core countries during the crisis. Additionally, 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2016) and Lanotte et al.(2016) discuss the lively debate about the regulatory implications 
of the sovereign-debt nexus.  
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sector as a whole. One of the most important aftermaths of the crisis was the freezing of the 
interbank markets and the subsequent financial markets fragmentation, in which banks in the 
core countries were relatively less willing to lend to those headquartered in the European 
periphery countries. The consequences of the crisis were intensified because of 
interconnections amongst banks within the European banking system, the so- F D O O H G  µ V R Y H U H L J Q 
 F U H G L W  U L V N  F K D Q Q H O ¶    % H W ]  H W  D O         Engle and Grobe, 2016; Gennaioli et al., 2014; Paltalidis 
et al., 2015).  To control for possible endogeneity issues due to macroeconomic conditions, we 
instrument the NPLs ratio with GDP growth and the unemployment rate. Moreover, we break 
our sample down into banks operating in the core and the European periphery countries to test 
possible differences in the intensity of the  W U D Q V P L V V L R Q  F K D Q Q H O  L Q  E R W K  µ ( X U R S H V ¶   $ V  H [ S H F W H G  
our results suggest that the impact of NPLs on the cost of capital is relatively greater for banks 
operating in the European periphery countries than for those in the core countries in the short-
term and the long-term. Accordingly, we also do find that the transmission effect on liquidity 
and lending supply is relatively higher in the European periphery countries than in the core 
countries. Importantly, our findings corroborate the fragmentation of the Eurozone banking 
markets as a corollary of the NPLs crisis.7 Finally, our results are robust to the inclusion of the 
10-year sovereign debt CDS as a control for the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on cost of 
capital, lending and liquidity supply.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical model as 
a foundation to our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical framework. 
Section 4 describes the main results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                          
7 See Anastasiou et al. (2017) for similar results.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
This section develops a theoretical model as a foundation to the subsequent empirical analysis. 
Our framework builds on two basic facts.  % D Q N V ¶   E D O D Q F H   V K H H W   G H F L V L R Q V   D U H   V W U R Q J O \ 
affected by value at risk (VAR) (e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2010). Second, loan performance is 
largely driven by the state of the economy, that is, by aggregate risk (e.g., BIS, 2005; Keenan, 
2000; Angelini et al., 2017; Ghosh, 2017; Lakdawala et al., 2017). 
We consider a bank that has inherited from the past legacy problematic loans (NPLs), debt 
raised to fund the legacy loans, and a capital (safe assets) endowment. The bank chooses 
 O H Q G L Q J  Y R O X P H  D Q G  Q H Z  H T X L W \  L V V X D Q F H   F D S L W D O  L Q F U H D V H   V R  D V  W R  P D [ L P L ] H  L Q V L G H U V ¶ expected 
profits subject to a VAR  F R Q V W U D L Q W   O R D Q  G H P D Q G  F R Q V W U D L Q W   D Q G  H T X L W \  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  S D U W L F L S D W L R Q 
constraints.  
Let us define the state of the economy (aggregate risk) #  distributed over the interval  
[# , #], with distribution function F(A). The greater the realization of #     W K H   E H W W H U   D V V H W V ¶ 
returns. Let us now consider the following legacy variables.  Legacy loans (NPLs), n, whose 
unit payoff is Û # ; Û  represents the quality of loans, the lower Û   the worse the quality of legacy 
loans. Legacy debt resulting from the origination of legacy loans is defined as a function 
increasing in n, D(n). Legacy safe assets is represented as k. Consequently, net assets ( G") is 
defined as the difference between legacy safe assets and legacy debt: Gæ: J ; L G F & : J ; , which 
is decreasing in n. 
New capital can be raised by new equity issuance, s. Investors providing capital to bank i 
require a gross return equal to the safe gross rate of interest, N
Ù
, plus the compensation for bank 
i  ¶ V  (undiversifiable) risk , i.e., the product of bank i beta times the equity market risk premium 
(ERP). So, the return that investors require to provide capital to bank i is: 
4
Ü
L N
Ù
E Ú
Ü
’42 : s ;  
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The larger the volume of NPLs held by the bank, the greater  W K H   E D Q N ¶ V exposure to 
aggregate risk, the greater its beta and the greater  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q  
A new loan requires one unit of resources and generates a random return whose realization 
depends on aggregate risk. For simplicity, we assume that the unit random return is #  and a 
new loan is positive in net present value: 
’ k# o P s 
The bank funds lending, x, with deposits and capital, and by virtue of deposit insurance, 
depositors are rewarded at the unitary gross rate. The new debt issued by the bank is 
 T F : G E O; , and the total amount of bank debt, & : J ; E T F : G E O; :  
T F : Gæ: J ; E O;  
The terminal value of the bank ( L  H    W K H  S D \ R I I  R I  W K H  E D Q N ¶ V  H T X L W \  K R O G H U V   L V 
Łä L I=T [ # : T E  Û J ; F >T F : Gæ: J ; E O; ?Ær _ 
The bank will default if the asset side realization, # : T E  Û J ; , falls below the repayment owed 
to depositors, T F : Gæ: J ; E O; , i.e., iff # Q º ? : Þ
ò
:
Æ; > æ ;
º > 
Æ      7 K H   E D Q N ¶ V   G H I D X O W   S U R E D E L O L W \   L V 
then  ( : #
4 ; , being  
#
4  
T F : Gæ: J ; E O;
T E  Û J  
increasing in new lending, x, and in legacy loans, n, and decreasing in legacy capital and new 
capital issuance OR r .    
The fraction of bank value accruing to the original shareholders will be s F Ù , where Ù  is 
the fraction accruing to the investors that provide new capital, s, and is such that Ù’ : Łä ;  equals 
the return required for providing risky capital s:    
Ù’ : Łä ; L O4
Ü
 
The cost of raising s units of new capital is then c(s) =   O4
Ü
 : 
?: O; P OÆ    ?æ: O; P r                                            : s ;  
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The expected payoff to the original shareholders (insiders) is thus ’ : Łä ; F ?: O; .  
The bank acts in the interest of the original shareholders and chooses the volume of lending, 
x, and new equity issuance s so as to maximize original  V K D U H K R O G H U V ¶   S D \ R I I    V X E M H F W   W R   D 
demand-feasibility constraints on lending, T Q T‰, and the VAR constraint that the bank 
default probability does not exceed a threshold level v, that is ( @º ? : Þ ò : Æ; > æ ;
º > 
Æ A Q R.  
 
The  E D Q N ¶ V optimization problem is then: 
   
º Ææ µ 4
– <# : T E  Û J ; F >T F : Gæ: J ; E O; ?=@(: # ; F ?: O;
”
,
 
s.t.  
 x VAR constraint: F @º ? : Þ
ò
:
Æ; > æ ;
º > 
Æ A Q R 
 x Demand constraint: T Q T‰ 
The VAR constraint amounts to a floor on the solvency probability (a ceiling to the 
bankruptcy probability). The VAR constraint sets a limit to bank lending T ˇ”¸  increasing in 
bank net capital (capital endowment less legacy debt), Gæ: J ; , and new equity issuance s, and 
decreasing in the volume n of NPLs     D Q G  W K H  P R U H  V R  W K H  O R Z H U  1 3 / V ¶  T X D O L W \ Û  
T Q T ˇ”¸ : GæÆOÆ Û J ;
ò T ˇ”¸
ò Gæ P r   Æ
ò T ˇ”¸
 ò O P r   Æ
ò T ˇ”¸
ò 02. O r
:
t ;  
Equation (2) express that NPLs reduce the volume of lending that satisfies the VAR constraint 
via two main channels. One is the capital channel: The greater the legacy loans, the greater 
legacy debt, and the lower net capital. The other is the risk channel. There is ample evidence 
that NPLs performance largely depends on the state of the economy, downturn versus upturn 
(e.g., Angelini et al., 2017; Ghosh, 2017; Lakdawala et al., 2017),  W K D W  L V    1 3 / V ¶   S H U I R U P D Q F H 
depends on aggregate risk and thereby NPLs risk is  S R V L W L Y H O \  F R U U H O D W H G  Z L W K  Q H Z  O R D Q V ¶  U L V N   
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At an optimum, necessarily either the VAR constraint or the demand constraint is binding: 
T Q     : T ˇ”¸ ÆT‰;  
and if the VAR constraint is binding, new equity issuance can be positive depending on the 
cost of capital. The lower capital and the greater NPLs, the lower T ˇ”¸ , the more likely that 
the VAR constraint binds, and therefore that the bank cost of capital is a determinant of bank 
lending.   
 
The analysis suggests: 
Hypothesis 1 (Cost of capital): A positive impact of NPLs on the bank ¶s cost of capital.  
Hypothesis 2 (Credit supply): A negative impact of the cost of capital on credit supply, and  
the more so the less capitalized is the bank  
To the extent that bank loans have longer maturity than bank debt (deposits), i.e., banks engage 
in maturity transformation and thereby in liquidity creation: 
Hypothesis 3 (Liquidity creation): A negative impact of the cost of capital on liquidity 
creation.  
We will examine whether these conjectures are validated by the data and the extent to which 
there is persistence. 
 
3. Data and empirical framework 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
We rely on bank balance sheet information provided by Bureau van Dijk ¶s Bankscope and 
Orbis Bank Focus databases. The dataset consists in quarterly information for a sample of 
Eurozone banks for the 2002Q1-2016Q4 period.8 We initially include consolidated balance 
                                                          
8 The Eurozone Members included in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain.  
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sheets and income statements of commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions for banks 
operating in the Eurozone countries. All the banks included in our database display information 
following and accounting period running from the 1st of January until 31st of December. Since 
the above-mentioned databases allow us to identify the listed banks, we extract all the 
institutions within this category. To remove ambiguity and double counting of firms, banks 
were selected at the highest corporate level possible, usually as holding companies. The final 
sample includes 225 listed banks.  
We consider that the years selected to perform this study are relevant since we are including 
the period before the financial crisis in which banks were granting the highest volume of credit 
and taking more risk (2002Q1-2007Q2), and the period that encompass the banking and the 
sovereign debt crises (2007Q3-2016Q4).  
Data are expressed in thousands of euros and are inflation adjusted. We also removed non-
consistent values such as zero total assets, negative equity values, and zero employees. Finally, 
we obtain a sample of 2,400 panel data for all sample years.  
Since the relevant stock market portfolio is the Eurozone market portfolio, we use the EURO 
STOXX Index to compute market returns. Information about equity prices at the bank- and 
market level, and sovereign credit risk is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream.   
We acquired monthly times series for each listed bank, the EURO STOXX index from 
January 1990 until December 2016 in order to take into consideration enough period window 
when estimating risk measures and expected returns. Data from sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps (hereafter CDS) has also been reached from the same database. Similarly, Thomsom 
Reuters Datastream provides information about sovereign CDS from 2008 onwards. Besides, 
we retrieved information on GDP and unemployment rate from Eurostat. Later on, we merge 
handly bank information into the main database, and the macroeconomic variables 
automatically through the period variable for each country.  
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Table 1 contains the definition of the variables employed in this article. We control for 
outliers in banking ratios since they might distort the estimations (see Adrian et al., 2015).  
 
3.2. Measuring the cost of capital: The CAPM model 
Bank cost of capital is given by the return that investors require to hold bank equity. We approximate 
 W K H  F R V W  R I  F D S L W D O  Z L W K  W K H  V W D Q G D U G  & $ 3 0  P R G H O   $ F F R U G L Q J O \   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶ required return equals the 
safe gross rate of interest plus the compensation for bank i  ¶ V    X Q G L Y H U V L I L D E O H  risk, i.e., the product of 
bank i beta times the equity market risk premium (ERP). 9  Bank cost of capital, i.e.,  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶ 
required return on bank equity, at date t is   N
Üç
: 
N
 Ü  ç
L 4
ç
Ù
E Ú
 Ü  ç
’4 2
ç
 
:
u;  
We take as the risk-free rate ( 4
ç
Ù
) the yield on the 10-year bund (German sovereign bond), 
 V L Q F H  W K L V  P D W X U L W \  P D W F K H V  W K H  V K D U H K R O G H U V ¶  L Q Y H V W P H Q W  K R U L ] R Q.  
The variable of interest is Ú
 Ü  ç
, known as the CAPM beta, it measures the covariance of the 
return of stock i (Ri) with the return of the market portfolio (Rm), over the variance of the market 
portfolio return: 
Ú
 Ü  ç
L
%KR: 4
Ü
Æ4
à
;
8=N: 4
à
;
:
v ;  
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology, we estimate time-varying betas ( Ú
 Ü  ç
) 
using a rolling-window OLS regression for each bank i with a window length equal to 24 
months (two years) since betas may change substantially over time.10 We approximate the 
equity market risk premium at date t, ’4 2
ç
, with the historical mean of the realized EURO 
STOXX returns in excess of the contemporaneous 10-year bund yield over the past 60 months 
                                                          
9 See King (2009) for a similar approach. 
10 Assuming constant betas for 5-years periods would be justified if betas were changing snail enough as in the 
case of diversified portfolios. Since new information is incorporated following the banking and the sovereign debt 
crises, for individual stocks, betas may change rapidly and the assumption of a window of 5-years period may be 
unsuitable.   
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(five years) of observations, beginning in January 1990. This procedure allows us to obtain 
estimations from 2002 until 2016. The bank specific equity premium at date t then equals the 
product of its CAPM Beta and the equity market risk premium at date t, Ú
Ü ç
:
’4 2
ç
; .  
 
3.3. Measuring liquidity creation  
 : H  F D O F X O D W H  E D Q N ¶ V i liquidity creation (LCit) in thousand euros following Berger and Bowman 
(2009) and Berger et al. (2016) three steps methodology on US banks. The components of LCit 
are listed in Appendix A.3: 
. %
 Ü  ç
L r ä w H                   E r ä w H                        
F r ä w H                 F r ä w H                          
F r ä w H                                                                                                                                
:
w;  
The interpretation of this indicator proceeds as follows. Banks create liquidity on the balance 
sheet when they transform illiquid assets into liquid assets. In other words, banks hold illiquid 
items and give the public the liquid ones. Thus, positive sign is applied to both illiquid assets 
and liquid liabilities, so when liquid liabilities are used to finance illiquid assets, liquidity is 
created. Following a similar reasoning, negative sign is applied to liquid assets, illiquid 
liabilities and equity, so when illiquid liabilities or equity are employed to finance a euro of 
liquid assets, liquidity is reduced. The negative sign on equity captures the direct effect of 
capital on the process of liquidity creation. The magnitudes of the weights are based on the 
euro-for-euro adding-up constraints, so that 1 euro of liquidity is created (destroyed) when 
banks transform 1 euro of illiquid (liquid) assets into 1 euro of liquid (illiquid) assets. Based 
on this constraint, a weight of ½ is assigned to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, and -½ to 
liquid assets, illiquid liabilities and equity. Therefore, when one euro of liquid liabilities 
finances one euro of illiquid assets liquidity creation equals:  ½ × 1 EUR + ½ × 1 EUR = 1 
EUR. The weight of ½ applied to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, since the volume of 
 O L T X L G L W \   F U H D W H G   L I   R Q O \   ‡ K D O I ·   G H W H U P L Q H G   E \   W K H   X V H   R I   I X Q G V    Z K L F K   D U H   Q H H G H G   W R   J H Q H U D W H 
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liquidity. The same reasoning is applied when 1 euro of illiquid liabilities or equity is used to 
finance 1 EUR of liquid assets (-½ × 1 EUR - ½ × 1 EUR = 1 EUR). In this case, 1 EUR of 
liquidity is destroyed (see Berger and Bowman, 2009).  
 
3.4. Testing for cointegration 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
We use panel data that consists of both time series and cross-section information. Regarding 
time series information, we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF hereafter) test to assess 
whether time series are affected by transitory or permanent shocks (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 
1981). The financial crisis may incorporate a structural break that would have affected the cost 
of capital and bank performance. In the presence of a structural break, the standard ADF test 
is biased towards the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. We follow the  3 H U U R Q ¶ V (1989) 
methodology that includes the single exogenous shock (known) break according to the 
underlying asymptotic theory by using a modified ADL model. Thus, we test for unit root in 
market and bank variables by using the following three equations:  
 
V
 Ü  ç
L à
54 E à 55 VÜ Æç ? 5 E à 56 & 6ç E à 57 PE ˝ ô 5 Ü ¿VÜ Æç ? Ü
¯
Ü @5
E A
 Ü  ç
:
x =;  
V
 Ü  ç
L à
64 E à 65 VÜ Æç ? 5 E à 67 PE à 68 6ç E à 69 $6 ç E ˝ ô 6 Ü ¿VÜ Æç ? Ü
¯
Ü @5
E A
 Ü  ç
:
x >;  
V
 Ü  ç
L à
74 E à 75 VÜ Æç ? 5 E à 76 & 6ç E à 77 PE à 78 6ç E à 79 $6 ç E ˝ ô 7 Ü ¿VÜ Æç ? Ü
¯
Ü @5
E A
 Ü  ç
:
x ?;  
where zit represents the variables to be tested corresponding to the following indicators. Firstly, 
we introduce the cost of capital (r it), or expected return on equity, as computed in expression 
(3). Secondly, we employ the CAPM beta ( Ú
 Ü  ç
) as shown in expression (4). Thirdly, we 
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 F D O F X O D W H   W K H   E D Q N ¶ V i book-value return on equity (ROEit) defined as the ratio profit (losses) 
before taxes over total equity. We also include the gap between the expected cost of capital and 
ROE : N
 Ü  ç
F 41 ’
 Ü  ç
; . Finally, we include the non-performing loans defined as the volume of 
non-performing loans over total loans to customers. 
The time variables proceed as follows. The variable Tt represents changes in levels and takes 
the one if t = 2007Q3, and zero otherwise. The slope dummy DTt represents the change in the 
trend of the slope function and takes the value one if t < 200Q3 and zero otherwise. The crisis 
dummy BTt controls for changes produced after the beginning of the financial crisis and takes 
the value one if t > 2007Q3, and zero otherwise. Each of the three models has a unit root with 
a structural break under the null hypothesis, as the dummy variables are integrated in the 
system. The alternative hypothesis is a broken trend stationary process.  
 
The Johansen-Fisher cointegration test for panel data 
The cointegration presented in this study follows the Johansen-Fisher test proposed by Maddala 
and Wu (1999). This procedure is a panel version of the individual Johansen (1988) 
cointegration test based on the fundamentals of the Fisher ADL panel unit root test. The 
Johansen-Fisher cointegration test adds the p-values of the Johansen individual eigenvectors 
and trace statistics. The following statistical test is derived:  
ª L F t ˝     : Ł
Ü
;
1 ï
6 ˙
6
˙
Ü @5
:
y ;  
where Ł
Ü
 is the p-value of from an individual cross-section i  « N, under the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration for panel data. 
 
 
3.5. Empirical approach 
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This section discusses the identification strategy to estimate the impact of NPLs on the cost of 
capital, the  G L I I H U H Q F H  E H W Z H H Q  W K H  F R V W  R I  F D S L W D O  D Q G  E D Q N ¶s performance, and market risk over 
time besides the steady state.11  
Our empirical strategy is based on the following autoregressive distributed lags (hereafter 
ADL) model with structural break as follows:12  
N
 Ü  ç
L Ù
4 E Ù 5 N Ü  ç ? 5 E Ù 6 02 .  Ü  ç E Ù 7 02 . Ü Æç ? 5 E :
Ü Æç ? 5
æ
0 E í
Ü
E Q
 Ü  ç
:
z ;  
where the variable r it is bank i cost of capital. Regarding the explanatory variables, the variable 
of interest is NPLit that represents the non-performing loans ratio as defined in Table 1, and the 
lagged value of the cost of capital ( N
Ü Æç ? 5). The matrix :
Ü Æç ? 5
æ  is a set of control variables that 
includes the following variables. The bank leverage ratio (LEVi,t-1) is measured as total assets 
over total equity. The variable LOANTAi,t-1 is computed as the ratio loans to customers over 
total assets and represents the level of risk that the bank is able to run. The variable Sizei,t-1 is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets and controls for firm size. The Lerner index 
(Lerneri,t-1) controls for the degree of competition and is calculated as the difference between 
the price and the marginal costs, divided by the price (see Appendix A.1). The income structure 
ratio (INCi,t-1) is computed as non-interest income to total assets and controls for business 
diversification. The efficiency ratio (EFFi,t-1) is calculated as operating costs over gross 
income. We control for the structural break after the beginning of the financial crisis by 
including the dummy variable Crisist and takes the value one if t        4     D Q G  ] H U R  R W K H U Z L V H . 
Finally, we control for the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on the dependent variables by 
including the 10-years sovereign CDS (CDSht) for the home country of each bank.  
                                                          
11 See Carbó-Valverde et al. (2017) for a similar approach. 
12 Note that the ADL model is equivalent to the error-correction mechanism by substituting U
Üç
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As for the interpretation of expression (8), the ADL allows us to test whether the relationship 
between NPLit and the indicators included in r it are actually dynamic (i.e., *
4 ª  Ù 5 L Ù 7 L r ) 
and to assess the contemporaneous effect, or short-term effect, (i.e., *
4 ª Ù 6 L r ). Furthermore, 
if the former hypotheses are rejected, the steady state can be estimated as follows:  
Û L
Ù
6 E Ù 7
s F Ù
5
     

Ù
5  O s : { ;  
where  Ù
5  O s is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of globally 
 D V \ P S W R W L F D O O \   µ V W D E O H ¶   V R O X W L R Q 13 Finally, if the null : *
4 ª Û L r ;  is rejected, we can draw the 
conclusion that there is a long-term equilibrium.  
The second step of this research tests the effects of the cost of capital on credit supply and 
liquidity creation. Since the consequences of holding NPLs in the balance sheet are transmitted 
to the banking markets as a higher cost of capital, we repeat the procedure proposed before to 
assess whether the increase in the cost of capital has an impact on credit supply and liquidity 
creation in the short-term and the long-term. Then, we propose the following ADL 
specification:  
.1#06 #
 Ü  ç
L Ü
4 E Ü 5 .1#06 #  Ü  ç ? 5 E Ü 6 N Ü  ç E Ü 7 N Ü  ç ? 5 E :
Ü Æç ? 5
æ
3 E í "
Ü
E Q"
 Ü  ç
:
sr ;  
All the variables and subscripts are defined above. The transmission of the cost of capital to 
credit supply is expected to be negative in the short-term and the long-term (i.e., / 2  D Q G /3 < 0, 
 D Q G   _/1| < 1). Finally, we are also interested in analysing whether the cost of capital have 
repercussions on ban  N V ¶   F D S D F L W \   W R   J H Q H U D W H   O L T X L G L W \    $ F F R U G L Q J   W R   W K H   U H D V R Q L Q J   H [ S R V H G 
above, we propose the following ADL model: 
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13 Two further solutions are possible. The unstable solution or hysteresis ( Ù L s) means that the solution contains 
a linear trend and that the initial condition exerts full influence on yit. The explosive solution (  Ù  P s) is the 
 F R Q W U D U \  R I  W K H  µ V W D E O H ¶  V R O X W L R Q   L  H     Whe effect of the regressor is divergent on yit. 
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where LCit represents liquidity creation as defined in expression (5), and all the variables and 
subscripts are defined above.  
 
3.6. Testing for reverse causality: The Granger predictability test 
We use the Granger predictability test to assess the direction of the causality between NPLs 
and our variables of study: the cost of capital, CAPM beta, ROE and the gap between the cost 
of capital and ROE. We employ four lags (l) of the variables in order to capture the long-term 
effects of NPLs on the target variables. Since we are using panel data, we follow the Holtz-
 ( D N L Q J  H W  D O  ¶ V          P H W K R G R O R J \  Z L W K  L Q G L Y L G X D O  I L [ H G  H I I H F W V  fi). The statistical significance 
of the test is measured by using an F-test.  
In order to test whether NPLs predict our variables of study, two conditions should be meet: 
i) The NPLs ratio (NPLit) should be statistically significant to the cost of capital (r it): 
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ii)  The cost of capital (r it) should not be significant in explaining NPLs (NPLit): 
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4. Results 
4.1. Summary statistics and parametric and non-parametric tests 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in this study. In Panel A, we 
observe  W K D W   E D Q N V ¶   F R V W   R I   F D S L W D O   r it) has a mean value of 16.09 percent ranging from 8.02 
percent to 30.78  S H U F H Q W   Z K L O H  E D Q N V ¶  S U R I L W D E L O L W \  J D S  r it  – R Eit) has a mean value of 12.36 
percent ranging from 0.01 percent to 55.28 percent. Regarding the components of the cost of 
capital, ba Q N V ¶   U L V N    P H D V X U H G   D V   W K H CAPM beta ( it), has a mean value of 1.77 ranging from 
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1.03 to 2.89, and the equity market risk premium (ERPt) displays a mean value of 7.10 percent 
ranging from 3.33 percent to 12.39 percent. The non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) is the 
variable of interest, displaying a mean value of 8.46 percent ranging from 0.63 percent to 47.85 
percent. Furthermore, leverage ratio (LEVit) displays a mean value of 16.36 ranging from 4.36 
to 46.54. Regarding lending and liquidity supply variables, the ratio loans to customers to total 
assets (LOANTAit) shows a mean value of 0.59 ranging from 0.06 to 0.88, and the ratio liquidity 
creation to total assets (LCit / TAit) has a mean value of 0.32 ranging from -0.46 to 1.02. Finally, 
the Lerner index (Lernerit) shows a mean value of 0.10 ranging from 0.08 to 0.13.  
We perform a mean-difference test, as shown in Panel B. In the first step, we create the 
dummy variable Crisist which takes the vale one from 2007Q3 onwards, and zero otherwise, 
to split the sample into two subperiods: before (2002Q1-2007Q2) and after (2007Q3-2016Q4) 
the banking crisis to test whether the crisis supposed a structural break. We find that the 
parametric test rejects the null (H0: Crisist (0)  – Crisist (1) = 0) for all the variables and, barely 
for bank size (sizeit). The results confirm that the alternative hypothesis (H0: Crisist (0)  – Crisist 
(1) < 0)  L V   F R Q I L U P H G   I R U   E D Q N V ¶   U L V N    it), the cost of capital (r it), and profitability gap (r it  – 
ROEit), thus indicating that banks were perceived as riskier institutions after the crisis as 
expected, thus increasing their cost of capital as expected. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis 
is also confirmed for the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) which confirms its growth path as 
a consequence of the crisis. Importantly, we also find that the levels of bank size (sizeit) credit 
supply (LOANTAit) and liquidity creation (LCit / TAit) are significantly higher after the crisis, 
reflecting some extent of inertia of these variables after the crisis. The other variables of interest 
are the book-value return on equity (ROEit) and the leverage ratio (LEVit) which are found to 
be higher before the crisis (H0: Crisist (0)  – Crisist (1) > 0).   
To complement the results presented above, we perform a parametric test for comparison of 
means distinguishing between core and European periphery countries, for the whole period 
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(2002Q1-2016Q4), the time period before the crisis (2002Q1-2007Q2) and after the crisis 
(2007Q3-2016Q4), as shown in Table 3. We show that the parametric test rejects the null 
hypothesis (H0: Core (0)  – Periphery (1) = 0) for the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) for the 
whole period. Specifically, the test rejects the null hypothesis for the crisis period. Similarly, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for the Beta CAPM (  it) for both subperiods, indicating that 
banks operating in European periphery countries are perceived as riskier than those located in 
the core countries. Accordingly, we find similar results for the cost of capital (r it) and 
profitability gap (r it  – ROEit). Moreover, the difference between the European periphery and 
core countries banks with regard to their Beta CAPM, cost of capital and profitability gap is 
more pronounced after the crisis. Subfigure 1.a shows that the evolution of the NPLs ratio 
(NPLit) dramatically split in the last years of the crisis, in particular because the volume of 
NPLs soars in the European periphery countries. Similarly, Subfigure 1.b shows that Beta 
CAPM ( it) accompanied the evolution of the NPLs ratio, reflecting that markets effectively 
perceive banks with high levels of NPLs as risky institutions. Furthermore, Subfigure 1.c and 
Subfigure 1.d which illustrate the evolution of the cost of capital (r it) and profitability gap (r it 
 – ROEit) respectively, show that profitability required from banks is significantly larger in 
countries with high levels of NPLit.  
[Insert Figure 1 over here] 
Figure 2 displays the distribution functions of the variable of interests. Subfigure 2.a shows 
that the dispersion of NPLs ratio is higher for the European periphery countries than for the 
core countries, being the difference in dispersion even greater after the crisis. These results are 
consistent with the distributions of the Beta CAPM shown in Subfigure 2.b. The median values 
and the dispersion of Beta CAPM are higher for the European periphery countries than the core 
countries for both periods. Accordingly, the values for the cost of capital (r it) and the 
profitability gap 
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 (r it  – ROEit) shown in Subfigures 2.c and 2.d, respectively, indicate that the cost of capital is 
higher for the banks operating in the European periphery countries than for those in the core 
countries.    
[Insert Figure 2 over here] 
Table 4 reports the mean values of the key variables divided in four quartiles of the non-
performing loans ratio (NPLit). The test shows, for the whole sample, that the Beta CAPM (  it) 
ranges from 1.84 in the first quartile to 2.23 in the fourth quartile. Accordingly, the cost of 
capital (r it) also displays a growing path ranging from 0.15 in the first quartile to 0.21 in the 
fourth quartile indicating that investors claim for higher returns when banks hold higher levels 
of NPLs in their balance sheets. On the other hand, the book-value return on equity (ROEit) 
shows a decreasing pattern insofar as the level of NPLs increases, becoming even negative in 
the fourth quartile. Consequently, the profitability gap (r it  – ROEit) diverge, ranging from 0.13 
in the first quartile to 0.28 in the fourth quartile. Finally, the F-overall test rejects the null 
hypothesis that risk and cost of capital measures are independent of the fourth quartiles of NPLs 
ratio (H0:  n-quartile = 0), which support the hypotheses that the amount of risk that banks 
accumulate in their balance sheets in form of NPLs is perceived by investors who utterly claim 
for higher returns.  
 
4.2. Short-term effect and long-term analysis of non-performing loans  
Before analysing the effects of non-performing loans on the cost of capital, we should test the 
existence of unit roots in the single variables, and cointegration between the interest variables 
taking into consideration the structural break. Panel A of Table 5 shows the results of the ADF 
test before the financial crisis (6.a), after the financial crisis (6.b), and during the whole period 
(6.c). The results reject the null hypothesis of unit roots at the 1 percent level and the 5 percent 
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level. Panel B of Table 5 displays the results of the Johansen-Fisher test for panel cointegration 
tests. The trace tests indicate that two cointegration exist before and after the financial crisis.    
The first question to be answer on this research is whether NPLs foster t  K H   E D Q N V ¶   F R V W   R I 
capital in the short-term and the long-term (H-1). The estimations of the expression (8) are 
shown in Panel A of Table 6 by using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. Two-, 
three- and four-period-lagged instrumental variables are used as instrument to control for 
problems of endogeneity derived from correlations of errors over time.14 The results suggest 
that a one-standard-deviation-increase in the NPLit increases the cost of capital by 0.06 standard 
deviations on average in the short-term for the Eurozone banks. Furthermore, we also find for 
the European periphery countries that one-standard-deviation-increase in NPLs ratio increases 
the cost of capital by 0.07 standard deviations in the short-term, whilst the increase is 
significantly lower for the core countries, 0.04 standard deviations. The results remain 
qualitatively stable and significant after including control variables (H0: . 2 = 0). Furthermore, 
the . 3 estimates for expression (8), which are positive, significant and lower than . 2, indicates 
that the cost of capital still growths in the subsequent periods towards a convergent equilibrium. 
Accurately, a one-standard-deviation increase in the NPLs ratio augments the cost of capital 
by 0.19 percent (p-value < 0.000) in the long-term for the banks in the Eurozone. Moreover, 
we also find that the long-term effect is higher for the banks operating in the European 
periphery countries than in the core countries. In this regard, we find that one-standard-
deviation increase in the NPLs ratio augment by 0.28 percent (p-value < 0.000) the cost of 
capital for banks headquartered in the European periphery countries, whilst the impact for 
banks located in the core countries equals 0.14 percent (p-value < 0.000), lower than the former 
group. Taken together, the results of this study suggest that the cost of capital is more sensible 
                                                          
14 Sargan test and serial autocorrelation test of second (AR(2)) and third order (AR(3)) are introduced to test the 
orthogonality of the instruments.  
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for banks headquartered in European periphery countries than in core countries. The results 
remain robust after including control variables in the regressions. In Panel B of Table 6, we 
substitute Crisist for the 10-year sovereign bonds CDS (CDSht) in order to control for the effects 
of the sovereign debt crisis on the cost of capital. Accordingly, CDSht is positive and significant, 
thus suggesting that the sovereign debt crisis was a source of increase in the cost of capital. 
Moreover, the results remain qualitatively stable for the variables of interest, thus suggesting 
the robustness of the results. These results confirm the first hypothesis of this study. The 
standard Sargan test and the autocorrelation tests (AR(2) and AR(3)) demonstrate the 
orthogonality of the instruments employed in the regressions.   
 
4.3. The effects of the cost of capital on credit supply  
The first research question of this study is whether increases in the cost of capital are translated 
to the supply of credit. The estimations of the expression (10) are shown in Panel A of Table 
7. Using an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, we test the effects of the cost of capital on credit 
supply (H-2). Two-, three-, and four-legged values of the explanatory variable are used as 
instruments. The estimation of the parameter 𝛿2 indicates that one-standard deviation increase 
in the cost of capital reduces the supply of credit by 0.03 percent for the Eurozone banks in the 
short-term. We also observe that one-standard-deviation increase in rt reduces LOANTAit by 
0.04 and 0.03 for banks operating in the European periphery and the core countries, 
respectively. Our results suggest that that the supply of credit is more sensible to variations in 
the cost of capital for banks operating in the European periphery countries than for those in the 
core countries. The results are robust after including control variables. Importantly, we are also 
interested in analysing the repercussions of bank leverage (LEVit) on credit supply. In other 
words, we investigate whether the difference found in both groups of banks might be driven 
by differences in leverage. On the one hand, we observe that banks in the European periphery 
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countries holds a significant lower level of leverage than those headquartered in the core 
countries. Despite the reduction in this variable for the core countries banks after the beginning 
of the crisis, the difference between both groups is still significant for this period. On the other 
hand, the estimates indicate that banks headquartered in the European periphery countries are 
more sensible to variations in leverage than the core country banks. Moreover, the estimates 
for the interaction variables LEVit × r it and LEVit × r it-1 are negative and significant, revealing 
that leverage enhances the sensitivity of lending to changes in the bank cost of capital. 
Regarding the long-term, the results reject the null for hypothesis for the cost of capital (H0: 
/ 2 = / 3 = 0), and the null for the adjustment parameter (H0: / 1 = 0 and / 1 = 1). We also find that 
the estimation for the parameter / 3 is negative, significant and lower than / 2 indicating that, in 
the long-term, a one-standard-deviation increase in the cost of capital (r it) reduces lending 
supply by 0.10 percent for the Eurozone banks. In addition, we also find that banks in the 
European periphery countries are more sensitive to changes in the cost of capital in the long-
term than banks in the core countries. This finding is consistent with the previous estimations 
for the short-term.  
As explained in the previous subsection, we are also interested in analysing the effects of 
the sovereign debt crisis on the supply of credit. In Panel B of Table 7 we substitute the Crisist 
time dummy for the 10-year sovereign bonds CDS (CDSht) for the period 2008Q1  – 2016Q4. 
The estimations demonstrate that one-standard-deviation increase in CDSht reduces the supply 
of credit by 0.69 percent for the Eurozone banks. In line with previous results, the credit supply 
for banks in the European periphery countries are more sensitive to the sovereign debt crisis 
than for banks in the core countries. Accordingly, this result is explained  W K U R X J K  W K H  µ L Q W H U E D Q N 
 F R O O D W H U D O   F K D Q Q H O ¶   D V   W K H   W U D Q V P L V V L R Q   P H F K D Q L V P   I U R P   W K H   S U L F H   D Q G   F U H G L E L O L W \   R I   V R Y Hreign 
bonds to the supply of credit. Sovereign debt is used as collateral pledged by banks in the 
interbank markets in order to obtain funding. For this reason, reductions in the value of 
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sovereign debt might restrict the access -or increase the cost- of banks to funding, which are 
the input to generate new credit (see Lakdawala et al., 2017).  
 
4.4. The effects of the cost of capital on liquidity creation  
The second question to be addressed in this research is whether increases in the cost of capital 
leads to reductions in liquidity creation (LCit/TAit) (H-3). The results are shown in Panel A of 
Table 8. To this purpose, we also estimate equation (11) using the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator. We find that the effects in the short-term and the long-term are negative and 
significant in line with the results presented above. The estimates also reject the null hypothesis 
for the cost of capital (H0: /  ¶2 = /  ¶3 = 0) and for the adjustment parameter (H0: /  ¶1 = 0 and /  ¶1 
= 1). We also obtain the expected sign for the effects of the cost of capital on liquidity creation 
in the short- W H U P  P H D Q L Q J  W K D W  L Q F U H D V H V  L Q  W K H  F R V W  F D S L W D O  U H G X F H V  E D Q N V ¶  F D S D F L W \  W R  J H Q H U D W H 
liquidity. We find that one-standard-deviation increase in the cost of capital (r it) reduces 
liquidity creation by 0.03 percent for the Eurozone banks. According to the results presented 
above, the results suggest that the effect is also more pronounced for the banks in the European 
periphery countries than for those headquartered in the core countries. The results are robust 
after including control variables. In addition, we also investigate the implication of leverage to 
absorb the effects of the cost of capital on liquidity creation. The negative and significant 
coefficient for LEVit reveals that the greater leverage the lower liquidity creation. In line with 
our findings on lending, leverage enhances the sensitivity of liquidity creation to changes in 
the bank cost of capital; banks with higher leverage experience greater reductions in their 
capacity to generate liquidity due to increases in their cost of capital. 
As for the long-term, the estimations suggest that one-standard-deviation increase in the cost 
of capital reduces liquidity creation by 0.12 standard deviations for the Eurozone banks. In line 
with previous results, liquidity creation is more sensitive to changes in the cost of capital for 
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the European periphery country banks (0.19 standard deviations) than for the core country 
banks (0.10 standard deviations). These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables 
and interactions, since we obtain similar steady state coefficients and standard errors.  
Panel B of Table 8 displays the results for the 10-year sovereign bonds CDS (CDSht) for the 
period 2008Q1  – 2016Q4. The results for the cost of capital in the short-term and in the long-
term are consistent with those presented in the above regressions. The results also suggest that 
the sovereign debt crisis reduced liquidity creation for both groups of banks, being the 
European periphery country banks more sensitive to changes to risk country than those banks 
operating in the core countries.  
To test the robustness of the liquidity variable measure (LCit/TAit) we create a modified 
 P H D V X U H   R I   O L T X L G L W \   F U H D W L R Q   E \   L Q F O X G L Q J   W K H   L W H P V   µ & X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V- F X U U H Q W ¶   D Q G 
 µ & X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V- V D Y L Q J V ¶   D V   V H P L O L T X L G   O L D E L O L W L H V    D Q G   µ F X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V- W H U P ¶   D Q   
 µ ’ H S R V L W V   I U R P   E D Q N V ¶   D V   / L T X L G   O L D E L O L W L H V    / & ¶ it/TAit). The results are shown in Table 9. We 
find that the results obtained with the new definition of liquidity creation (  / & ¶ it/TAit) are robust 
to the former measure (LCit/TAit).  
 
4.5. Granger predictability test: Results  
We are also interested in analysis the predictability between the NPLs ratio (NPLit), credit 
supply (LOANTAit) and liquidity creation (LCit/TAit) with the cost of capital (r it). We employ 
the Granger predictability test with four lags for the NPLs ratio, the lending supply variables, 
and the cost of capital. The vector of instrumental variables includes the unemployment rate 
(UNEMPht) and GDP growth (GDPht) at the country level to control for the influence of the 
business cycle on credit markets and the evolution of NPLs. Finally, valid inference is ensured 
since standard errors and test statistics are robust to heterokedasticity and clustered at the 
country level.   
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The results shown in Table 10 suggest that the NPLs ratio (NPLit) predict the cost of capital 
(r it), but the cost of capital does not predict the NPLs ratio. Similarly, we also find that the cost 
of capital predicts credit supply (LOANTAit) and liquidity creation (LCit/TAit), but the LOANTAit 
and (LCit/TAit) do not predict the cost od capital.   
 
4.6. Robustness test: Testing for   µ I D O V H   S R V L W   Y H V ¶   D Q G   µ I D O V H   Q H J D W L Y H V ¶   X V L Q J 
a subsample of German banks 
The specifications presented in Table 6 suggest that non-performing loans increase the cost of 
capital for the Eurozone banks, regardless they operate in the European periphery countries or 
the core countries. Furthermore, the results presented in Table 7 and Table 8 show that the 
increased cost of capital exert a negative influence in credit supply and liquidity creation.  
To test the robustness of the results, we replicate in Appendix B the estimations presented 
above for a subsample of German banks. We perform this experiment because Germany is the 
Eurozone country with a relatively low level of NPLs ratio and cost of capital. Importantly, 
Germany has been immune from the shocks that have affected the European periphery. Since 
the estimated coefficients are consistent with those derived for the entire sample, we can draw 
the conclusion that our results are not spurious. In other words, the results support the 
 µ W K H R U H W L F D O ¶  U H O D W L R Q V K L S  D P R Q J  W K H  Y D U L D E O H V  D Q D O \ V H G  L Q  W K L V  U H V H D U F K   
 
5. Conclusions 
This article analyses the repercussions of NPLs on the cost of capital  –or equity- and utterly, 
on lending and liquidity supply over time. To this purpose, we create a unique dataset by 
combining information from Bureau van Dijk ¶ V   % D Q N V F R S H   D Q G   2 U E L V   % D Q N   ) R F X V    P D U N H W 
information from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and macroeconomic information from 
Eurostat.  
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The results of this study draw the conclusion that banks holding greater levels of NPLs are 
claimed for increasing profitability by equity investors in the short-term and the long-term. 
Investors perceive these banks as riskier than their counterparts or other assets, claiming greater 
returns on the equity holdings of these banks and hence inducing an increase in their cost of 
capital. 
As a result, these banks will have a restricted access to equity, thus reducing their lending 
and liquidity provision. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers to 
disentangle this transmission channel. Furthermore, we find that the transmission channel from 
NPLs to bank cost of capital, credit and liquidity provision is economically more significant 
for banks operating in the so-called European periphery countries than those based in the core 
countries. 
Finally, the Granger predictability test confirms the transmission channel: the NPLs ratio is 
a determinant of the cost of capital, but not otherwise. Similarly, the cost of capital predicts 
credit and liquidity supply, but no predictability is found in the opposite direction. The results 
are robust after repeating the experiment for a subsample of German banks.  
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Table 1: Variable definition 
Variable Acronym Definition  Source 
Bank variables  
 % D Q N V ¶  % H W D-
CAPM 
 it This variable measures the sensitivity of expected 
 H [ F H V V   E D Q N ¶ V   F D S L W D O   D V V H W V   U H W X U Q V   W R   W K H 
expected excess market returns. This coefficient 
 U H S U H V H Q W V  E D Q N ¶ V  U L V N  W D N L Q J  
 $ X W K R U V ¶  F D O F X O D W L R Q 
based on Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. 
Non-performing 
loans ratio 
NPLit This variable is measured as the ratio impaired 
loans over total loans. 
Bankscope 
Return on equity ROEit  7 K L V   Y D U L D E O H   F R Q W U R O V   I R U   E D Q N ¶ V   S H U I R U P D Q F H  
This ratio is measured as operating profits (loss) 
over total equity. 
Bankscope 
Cost of capital r it This variable measures investors  ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q 
on bank equity. This indicator is computed as 
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 $   W K R U ¶ V  F D O F X O D W L R Q 
based on Bankscope and 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. 
Profitability gap r it - ROEit This variable measures the difference between 
the investors  ¶ required return and the profitability 
that the bank is able to generate.  
 $ X W K R U ¶ V  F D O F X O D W L R Q 
based on Bankscope and 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. 
 % D Q N ¶ V  V L ] H Sizeit Natural logarithm of one-period lagged total 
assets. 
Bankscope 
Customer loans LOANTAit This ratio  P H D V X U H V   W K H   E D Q N ¶ V   E X V L Q H V V   Y R O X P H  
This variable is measured as customer loans over 
total assets. 
Bankscope 
Liquidity 
creation 
LCit / TAit LCit = 0.5 × (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities  – 
liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities  – equity) 
Bankscope 
Leverage  LEVit  7 K L V   U D W L R   F R Q W U R O V   I R U   E D Q N ¶ V   V R O Y H Q F \    7 K L V 
variable is constructed as the ratio bank total 
assets over total equity.  
Bankscope 
Degree of 
competition 
Lernerit This index is defined as the difference between 
 W K H  S U L F H  D Q G  E D Q N ¶ V  P D U J L Q D O  F R V W V  R Y H U  W K H 
price. This variable measures the capacity of the 
bank to set a price above the marginal costs.  
Bankscope 
Income structure INCit This ratio is measured as non-interest income 
over total net income. This variable controls for 
business diversification.  
Bankscope 
Efficiency EFFit This ratio is measured as operating costs over 
gross income. 
Bankscope 
Macroeconomic variables  
Crisis dummy Crisist Dummy variable which takes the value one if 
from 2007Q3 onwards, and zero otherwise.  
Eurostat 
Sovereign credit 
risk 
CDSht This variable is the 10-years maturity sovereign 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level 
(h). 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
GDP growth GDPht This variable is measured as the variation rate of 
GDP at the country level (h). 
Eurostat 
Unemployment 
rate 
UNEMPht This variable is measured as the unemployment 
rate at the country level (h).  
Eurostat 
Notes: i, h, and t subscripts refer to bank, country and time, respectively.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the distribution of the variables used in this research between 2002Q1 and 2016Q4.Values for 
CDS are available from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel B 
displays mean values and standard errors for the same variables but referred to the years before (2002Q1  – 
2007Q2) and after (2007Q3  – 2016Q4) the crisis.  it  is measured as the covariance between the return of the stock 
i and the return of the market portfolio over the variance of the market portfolio return. ERPt is calculated as the 
historical mean of the realized EURO STOXX returns in excess of the contemporaneous 10-year bund yield over 
the past 60 months (five years) of observations, beginning in January 1990. The cost of capital (r it) is  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶ 
required return on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it times equity risk premium 
(ERPt). The Return on Equity (ROEit) is measured as operating profits (losses) over total equity. The variable r it - 
ROEit represents the profitability gap. NPLit is measured as the ration impaired loans to total loans.  Sizeit is the 
natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). LEVit is measured as total assets over total equity. 
Lernerit is computed as the price minus marginal costs over price. INCit is the non-interest income over total net 
income ratio. EFFit is calculated as the operating costs over gross income ratio. CDSht is the 10-years maturity 
sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). GDPit is measured as the variation rate of GDP at 
the country level (h). UNEMPht is measured as the unemployment rate at the country level (h). The parametric 
tests estimate the differences in mean values under the null H0: Crisist (0)  – Crisist (1) = 0, being Crisist = 1 if t   
2007Q3, and zero, otherwise. The sample includes commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions existing 
in the Euro area countries.  
PANEL A: Description of the sample 
 N Mean SD Min.  Pc. 25 Median Pc. 75 Max. 
Bank variables 
 it 2,400 1.7658 0.5490 1.0312 1.2797 1.6806 2.1804 2.8976 
ERPt 2,400 0.0710 0.0303 0.0333 0.0409 0.0647 0.1064 0.1239 
r it 2,400 0.1609 0.0657 0.0802 0.1067 0.1467 0.2010 0.3078 
r it - ROEit 2,400 0.1236 0.1663 0.0001 0.0075 0.1047 0.1996 0.5528 
NPLit 2,400 0.0875 0.0846 0.0063 0.0343 0.0607 0.1136 0.4785 
Sizeit 2,400 24.2487 2.1571 18.5862 22.7461 24.0957 25.8649 28.2834 
ROEit 2,400 0.0588 0.1308 -0.3235 0.0250 0.0787 0.1268 0.2609 
LOANTAit 2,400 0.5964 0.2028 0.0552 0.5340 0.6357 0.7477 0.8781 
LCit / TAit 2,400 0.3180 0.2765 -0.4631 0.1243 0.3299 0.5172 1.0236 
LC ¶it / TAit 2,400 0.2132 0.1911 -0.4242 0.1024 0.2358 0.3323 0.7347 
LEVit 2,400 16.3633 7.8301 4.3577 11.0884 14.8399 19.1339 46.5409 
Lernerit 2,400 0.1020 0.0333 0.0784 0.0784 0.1020 0.1255 0.1255 
INCit 2,400 0.3625 0.2257 0.0000 0.2250 0.3084 0.4256 1.1734 
EFFit 2,400 0.3044 0.1364 0.1020 0.2152 0.2700 0.3514 0.8571 
Macroeconomic variables 
Crisist 2,400 0.6333 0.4820 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CDSit 1,251 124.7894 140.9011 10.3333 46.0500 76.5000 145.6400 1190.6200 
GDPht 2,460 0.0131 0.0271 -0.0983 0.0030 0.0136 0.0269 0.2760 
UNEMPht 2,400 8.9772 4.4502 3.1333 5.7333 8.3000 10.2333 26.2000 
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PANEL B: Parametric test for comparison of means before (2002Q1  – 2007Q2) and after 
(2007Q3  – 2016Q4) the crisis (H0: Crisist (0)  – Crisist (1) = 0). Standard errors in parentheses.  
 2002Q1  – 2007Q2 2007Q3  – 2016Q4 t-test 
[p-value] 
 it 1.6653 
(0.0138) 
1.8182 
(0.0109) 
-8.3959 
[0.0000] 
r it 0.1170 
(0.0009) 
0.1837 
(0.0013) 
-34.6443 
[0.0000] 
r it - ROEit 0.0877 
(0.0109) 
0.1924 
(0.0041) 
-5.3886 
[0.0000] 
NPLit 0.0465 
(0.0043) 
0.0937 
(0.0034) 
-5.2897 
[0.0000] 
Sizeit 24.0591 
(0.1422) 
24.2878 
(0.0673) 
-1.4132 
[0.0789] 
ROEit 0.1243 
(0.0029) 
0.0465 
(0.0018) 
18.1944 
[0.0000] 
LOANTAit 0.5660 
(0.0116) 
0.6026 
(0.0068) 
-2.4042 
[0.0082] 
LCit / TAit 0.2785 
(0.0074) 
0.3024 
(0.0036) 
-2.8234 
[0.0024] 
 / & ¶ it / TAit 0.2234 
(0.0054) 
0.2111 
(0.0023) 
2.1478 
[0.0159] 
LEVit 17.8797 
(0.4686) 
16.0513 
(0.2475) 
3.1218 
[0.0009] 
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Table 3. Parametric tests for comparison of means for European core and periphery countries, before and after the crisis. 
This table breaks the sample down between banks in the European periphery countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain) and in the European core 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, and The Netherlands). The parametric tests are performed under the null H0: Core (0)  – Periphery 
(1) = 0 for the following periods: (i) the whole period (2002Q1  – 2016Q4), (ii) before the crisis (2002Q1  – 2007Q2), and (iii) after the crisis (2007Q3  – 2016Q4).  it is measured as the covariance 
between the return of the stock i and the return of the market portfolio over the variance of the market portfolio return. The cost of capital (r it) is  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q on bank equity computed 
as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt). The Return on Equity (ROEit) is measured as operating profits (losses) over total equity. The variable r it - ROEit 
represents the profitability gap. NPLit is measured as the ration impaired loans to total loans. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). LOANTAit  L V  W K H  U D W L R  F X V W R P H U V ¶ 
loans to total assets. LCit / TAit is measured as 0.5 × (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities  – liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities  – equity) / TAit. The variable LC ¶it  L Q F O X G H V  W K H  L W H P V  µ & X V W R P H U  G H S R V L W V-
 F X U U H Q W ¶  D Q G  µ & X V W R P H U  G H S R V L W V-  V D Y L Q J V ¶  D    V H P L O L T X L G  O L D E L O L W L H V   D Q G  µ F X V W R P H U  G H S R V L W V-  W H U P ¶  D Q G  µ ’ H S R V L   V  I U R P  E D Q N V ¶  D V  / L T X L G  O L D E L O L W L H V  LEVit is measured as total assets over total equity. 
CDSht is the 10-years maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). The coefficients represent mean values, whereas standard errors are in parentheses. The t-statistics 
is reported for each test, and the p-value is shown in brackets.  
 2002Q1  – 2016Q4  2002Q1  – 2007Q2   2007Q3  – 2016Q4 
 Core Periphery t-test 
[p-value]  Core Periphery 
t-test 
[p-value] 
 Core Periphery t-test 
[p-value] 
 it 1.6770 
(0.0127) 
1.8296 
(0.0117) 
-8.7096 
[0.0000] 
 1.6243 
(0.0217) 
1.6942 
(0.0179) 
-2.4850 
[0.0065] 
 1.7041 
(0.0156) 
1.9012 
(0.0148) 
-8.9922 
[0.0000] 
r it 0.1550 
(0.0015) 
0.1650 
(0.0014) 
-4.7107 
[0.0000] 
 0.1145 
(0.0014) 
0.1187 
(0.0012) 
-2.2761 
[0.0115] 
 0.1759 
(0.0019) 
0.1894 
(0.0017) 
-5.1488 
[0.0000] 
r it - ROEit 0.1412 
(0.0049) 
0.2100 
(0.0053) 
-8.1650 
[0.0000] 
 0.0738 
(0.0107) 
0.1117 
(0.0231) 
-1.6861 
[0.0963] 
 0.1427 
(0.0050) 
0.2158 
(0.0054) 
-8.4328 
[0.0000] 
NPLit 0.0386 
(0.0018) 
0.1018 
(0.0037) 
-9.0369 
[0.0000] 
 0.0568 
(0.0086) 
0.0444 
(0.0049) 
1.0806 
[0.2825] 
 0.0366 
(0.0018) 
0.1114 
(0.0041) 
-9.9275 
[0.0000] 
Sizeit 23.7881 
(0.1262) 
24.4791 
(0.0646) 
-5.4071 
[0.0000] 
 23.9616 
(0.3405) 
24.0927 
(0.1516) 
-0.4018 
[0.6882] 
 23.7618 
(0.1361) 
24.5698 
(0.0711) 
-5.8098 
[0.0000] 
ROEit 0.0761 
(0.0019) 
0.0445 
(0.0024) 
9.8814 
[0.0000] 
 0.1120 
(0.0045) 
0.1345 
(0.0039) 
-3.7650 
[0.0002] 
 0.0693 
(0.0021) 
0.0276 
(0.0027) 
11.8953 
[0.0000] 
LOANTAit 0.4868 
(0.0135) 
0.6510 
(0.0042) 
-14.5876 
[0.0000] 
 0.4634 
(0.0314) 
0.6017 
(0.0098) 
-5.5477 
[0.0000] 
 0.4903 
(0.0148) 
0.6625 
(0.0045) 
-13.7765 
[0.0000] 
LCit / TAit 0.3279 
(0.0042) 
0.2663 
(0.0048) 
9.6727 
[0.0000] 
 0.3211 
(0.0086) 
0.2219 
(0.0125) 
6.7324 
[0.0000] 
 0.3296 
(0.0048) 
0.2744 
(0.0052) 
7.8057 
[0.0000] 
 / & ¶ it / TAit 0.2400 
(0.0029) 
0.1843 
(0.0031) 
12.9074 
[0.0000] 
 0.2616 
(0.0067) 
0.1727 
(0.0085) 
8.2823 
[0.0000] 
 0.2349 
(0.0033) 
0.1865 
(0.0033) 
10.2838 
[0.0000] 
LEVit 17.3101 
(0.5207) 
15.8899 
(0.2038) 
3.0375 
[0.0012] 
 20.9633 
(1.4619) 
16.8130 
(0.3432) 
4.0042 
[0.0000] 
 16.7565 
(0.5523) 
15.6731 
(0.2377) 
2.0895 
[0.0185] 
CDSht - - -  - - -  66.3132 
(2.3452) 
154.9519 
(5.9483) 
-11.7934 
[0.0000] 
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Table 4. Means of the key variables depending on the quartiles of NPLit. 
This table displays the summary statistics of the main variables employed in this study by quartiles of 
non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) calculated as impaired loans to total loans for the whole sample. The 
regression coefficients represent the mean variable, whilst the standard errors are represented in 
parentheses. All specifications are estimated using OLS.  it is measured as the covariance between the 
return of the stock i and the return of the market portfolio over the variance of the market portfolio 
return. The cost of capital (r it) is  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q on bank equity computed as the return of the 
risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt). The Return on Equity (ROEit) is measured as 
operating profits (losses) over total equity. The variable r it - ROEit represents the profitability gap. Sizeit 
is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). The F-statistics are shown to test the 
differences in the dependent variables amongst the quartiles of NPLit, and the p-value is represented in 
brackets. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
F-test 
[p-value] 
 it 1.8142*** 
(0.0275) 
1.8334*** 
(0.0262) 
1.9696*** 
(0.0242) 
2.2221*** 
(0.0261) 
5,754.41 
[0.0000] 
r it 0.1528*** 
(0.0036) 
0.1754*** 
(0.0034) 
0.2077*** 
(0.0032) 
0.2113*** 
(0.0034) 
3,053.36 
[0.0000] 
r it - ROEit 0.1290*** 
(0.0092) 
0.1407*** 
(0.0113) 
0.1904*** 
(0.0079) 
0.2755*** 
(0.0081) 
521.95 
[0.0000] 
Sizeit 24.540*** 
(0.127) 
25.512*** 
(0.127) 
25.070*** 
(0.127) 
24.786*** 
(0.127) 
38,949.65 
[0.0000] 
ROEit 0.1132*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0912*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0038) 
456.61 
[0.0000] 
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Table 5: Unit root and cointegration analysis with structural break 
This table presents the results of the tests for unit root and cointegration. Panel A displays the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the key variables employed in this study. The coefficients represent 
the impact on the one-period-lagged coefficient of the dependent variable, whilst the standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. Panel B shows the results of the Johansen- ) L V K H U ¶ V  S D Q H O  F R L Q W H J U D W L R Q  W H V W 
for the endogenous variables of this study. Endogenous variables include the cost of capital (r it) defined 
by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times 
equity risk premium (ERPt); NPLs ratio (NPLit) measured as the ratio impaired loans over total loans; 
credit supply (LOANTAit) calculated as  W K H  U D W L R  F X V W R P H U V ¶  O R D Q V  W R  W R W D O  D V V H W V  TAit); liquidity creation 
(LCit / TAit) computed as 0.5 × (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities  – liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities  – 
equity) / TAit.; and the modified liquidity creation (  / & ¶ it / TAit) that  L Q F O X G H V   W K H   L W H P V   µ & X V W R P H U 
deposits- F X U U H Q W ¶   D Q G   µ & X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V- V D Y L Q J V ¶   D V   V H P L O L T X L G   O L D E L O L W L H V    D Q G   µ F X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V-
 W H U P ¶  D Q G  µ ’ H S R V L W V  I U R P  E D Q N V ¶  D V  / L T X L G  O L D E L O L W L H V  Trace (statistical t) is reported for the years before 
(2002Q1  – 2007Q2) and after (2007Q3  – 2016Q4) the crisis. Estimates followed by *, **, *** represent 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit roots at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively; whilst estimates 
followed by +, ++, +++ mean that cointegration exists at the 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  
PANEL A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with four lags 
 Model A  Model B  Model C 
 
Coefficient (  1) t-stats  Coefficient (  1) t-stats  Coefficient (  1) t-stats 
r it -0.4807*** 
(0.0266) 
-18.71 
 
-0.4584*** 
(0.0214) 
-21.42 
 
-0.4556*** 
(0.0286) 
-15.93 
NPLit -0.6033*** 
(0.2655) 
-2.27 
 
-0.6034** 
(0.2655) 
-2.27 
 
-0.6034** 
(0.2665) 
-2.27 
LOANTAit -0.8937*** 
(0.0680) 
-13.13 
 
-0.8433*** 
(0.0498) 
-16.91 
 
-0.6922*** 
(0.1672) 
-4.14 
LCit/TAit -0.8099*** 
(0.1888) 
-4.29 
 
-0.7064** 
(0.1979) 
-3.57 
 
-0.7197*** 
(0.0737) 
-9.76 
 / & ¶ it / TAit -0.7875*** 
(0.1090) 
-7.22 
 
-0.6467** 
(0.2567) 
-2.52 
 
-0.7938*** 
(0.0759) 
-10.45 
 
PANEL B: Johansen-  ) L V K H U ¶ V  S D Q H O  F R L Q W H J U D W L R Q  W H V W. Endogenous variable: r it 
H0: Range = r 2002Q1  – 2007Q2  2007Q3  – 2016Q4 
NPLit r = 0 106.0438+++  338.4015+++ 
  U       42.1169+++  100.0807+++ 
LOANTAit r = 0 184.7151+++  768.1435+++ 
  U       65.0611+++  163.8656+++ 
LCit/TAit r = 0 116.3871+++  497.4280+++ 
  U       56.3515+++  92.7950+++ 
 / & ¶ it / TAit r = 0 124.6141+++  488.7806+++ 
  U       52.5215+++  90.1121+++ 
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Table 6. The effects of non- S H U I R U P L Q J  O R D Q V  R Q  E D Q N ¶ V  F R V W  R I  F D S L W D O  r it). 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit), measured as the 
ration impaired loans to total loans,  R Q   E D Q N ¶ V   F R V W   R I   F D S L W D O    4 X D U W H U O \   R E V H U Y D W L R Q V   I R U   ( X U R ] R Q H   O L V W H G   E D Q N V 
are applied for all the specifications. Panel A includes the regression analysis the whole sample. Panel B includes 
the regression results for the post-crisis period. The dependent variable is the cost of capital (r it) defined by  
 L Q Y H V W R U V ¶   U H T X L U H G   U H W X U Q on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk 
premium (ERPt). Sizeit is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). LEVit is measured as total 
assets over total equity. The variables Crisisit controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable which 
takes the value one after the beginning of the crisis (t             4       D Q G   ] H U R    R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years 
maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). Values for CDS are available from 
2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the  V S H F L I L F D W L R Q V  D U H  H V W L P D W H G   X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R  D Q G  % R Q G ¶ V               * 0 0   7 K H  V H W  R I 
instruments includes t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate 
(UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect 
between the dependent variable and the NPL ratio. Columns (1) and (4) display the regression values for all the 
countries, columns (2) and (5) for the periphery countries, and columns (3) and (6) for the core countries. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, **, *** are statistically 
significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 PANEL A: The whole period  
(2002Q1-2016Q4) 
 
PANEL B: The period after the crisis 
(2008Q1  – 2016Q4)  
 Eurozone Periphery Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 Eurozone Periphery Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
r it-1 0.482*** 
(0.011) 
0.542*** 
(0.016) 
0.431*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.515*** 
(0.022) 
0.534*** 
(0.031) 
0.447*** 
(0.023) 
NPLit 0.046*** 
(0.013) 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.074*** 
(0.023) 
0.054*** 
(0.022) 
NPLit-1 0.032*** 
(0.015) 
0.045*** 
(0.018) 
0.025*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.057*** 
(0.015) 
0.073*** 
(0.026) 
0.052*** 
(0.012) 
LEVit-1 0.143*** 
(0.030) 
0.153*** 
(0.032) 
0.136*** 
(0.030) 
 
0.173*** 
(0.035) 
0.179*** 
(0.036) 
0.162*** 
(0.033) 
Crisist 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
   
 
CDSht-1    
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Xit-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Steady 
state 
0.151*** 
(0.046) 
0.214*** 
(0.055) 
0.104*** 
(0.042) 
 
0.252*** 
(0.064) 
0.315*** 
(0.069) 
0.192*** 
(0.058) 
        
N 1,134 682 452  451 279 172 
Sargan 
test 0.557 0.412 0.520  0.627 0.777 0.699 
AR (2) 0.446 0.323 0.404  0.508 0.484 0.402 
AR (3) 0.379 0.267 0.335  0.289 0.330 0.375 
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Table 7. The effects of the cost of capital (r it) on the supply of credit (LOANTAit) 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the cost of capital (r it), defined by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G 
return on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt), on 
credit supply. Quarterly observations for Eurozone listed banks are applied for all the specifications. The 
dependent variable is the ratio loans to customers to total assets (LOANTAit). Panel A includes the regression 
analysis the whole sample. Panel B includes the regression results for the post-crisis period. LEVit is measured as 
total assets over total equity. The variables Crisisit controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable 
which takes the value one after the beginning of the crisis (t             4       D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years 
maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h).  Values for CDS are available from 
2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the  V S H F L I L F D W L R Q V  D U H  H V W L P D W H G   X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R  D Q G  % R Q G ¶ V               * 0 0   7 K H  V H W  R I 
instruments include t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate 
(UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect 
between the cost of capital and LOANTAit. All the variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) and (4) display the 
regression values for the whole sample, columns (2) and (5) for the periphery countries, and columns (3) and (6) 
for the core countries. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, 
**, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 PANEL A: The whole period  
(2002Q1-2016Q4) 
 
PANEL B: The period after the crisis 
(2008Q1  – 2016Q4) 
 Eurozone Periphery Countries 
Core 
Countries  Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
LOANTAit-1 0.429
*** 
(0.115) 
0.489*** 
(0.119) 
0.417*** 
(0.116) 
 
0.595*** 
(0.121) 
0.653*** 
(0.127) 
0.521*** 
(0.116) 
N
Üç
 
-0.089*** 
(0.014) 
-0.093*** 
(0.015) 
-0.085*** 
(0.014) 
 
-0.063*** 
(0.011) 
-0.076*** 
(0.012) 
-0.057*** 
(0.012) 
N
Üç ? 5 
-0.080*** 
(0.016) 
-0.085*** 
(0.0.17) 
-0.074*** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.055*** 
(0.014) 
-0.063*** 
(0.016) 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
LEVit-1 -0.115
*** 
(0.019) 
-0.121*** 
(0.022) 
-0.106*** 
(0.020) 
 
-0.107*** 
(0.016) 
-0.113*** 
(0.015) 
-0.094*** 
(0.015) 
N
Üç
× LEVit-1 -0.165
*** 
(0.027) 
-0.173*** 
(0.025) 
-0.156*** 
(0.026) 
 
-0.116*** 
(0.021) 
-0.120*** 
(0.022) 
-0.093*** 
(0.017) 
N
Üç ? 5  × 
LEVit-1 
-0.125*** 
(0.016) 
-0.132*** 
(0.017) 
-0.117*** 
(0.016) 
 
-0.096*** 
(0.015) 
-0.104*** 
(0.018) 
-0.063*** 
(0.016) 
Crisist -0.325
*** 
(0.051) 
-0.336*** 
(0.063) 
-0.311*** 
(0.053) 
    
CDSht-1     -0.001
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.524
*** 
(0.115) 
0.554*** 
(0.120) 
0.523*** 
(0.114) 
 
0.542*** 
(0.073) 
0.621*** 
(0.083) 
0.512*** 
(0.053) 
Xit-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Steady state -0.296
*** 
(0.131) 
-0.348** 
(0.166) 
-0.273** 
(0.145) 
 
-0.291*** 
(0.104) 
-0.401*** 
(0.111) 
-0.213*** 
(0.102) 
N 1,134 682 452  451 279 172 
Sargan test 0.708 0.585 0.303  0.619 0.587 0.544 
AR (2) 0.328 0.364 0.204  0.427 0.490 0.324 
AR (3) 0.287 0.229 0.162  0.186 0.195 0.162 
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Table 8. The effects of the cost of capital (r it) on liquidity creation (LCit/TAit) 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the cost of capital (r it),  defined by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G 
return on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt), on 
liquidity creation. Quarterly observations for Eurozone listed banks are applied for all the specifications. The 
dependent variable is the ratio liquidity creation to total assets (LC/TAit) computed as 0.5 × (illiquid assets + liquid 
liabilities  – liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities  – equity) over total assets (TAit). Panel A includes the regression 
analysis the whole sample. Panel B includes the regression results for the post-crisis period. LEVit is measured as 
total assets over total equity.The variables Crisisit controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable 
which takes the value one after the beginning of the crisis (t             4       D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years 
maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). Values for CDS are available from 
2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the  V S H F L I L F D W L R Q V  D U H  H V W L P D W H G   X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R  D Q G  % R Q G ¶ V (1991) GMM. The set of 
instruments include t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate 
(UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect 
between the cost of capital and LC/TAit. All the variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) and (4) display the 
regression values for the whole sample, columns (2) and (5) for the periphery countries, and columns (3) and (6) 
for the core countries. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, 
**, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 PANEL A: The whole period  
(2002Q1-2016Q4) 
 
PANEL B: The period after the crisis 
(2008Q1  – 2016Q4) 
 Eurozone Periphery Countries 
Core 
Countries  Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
(LC / TA)it-
1 
0.512*** 
(0.124) 
0.643*** 
(0.127) 
0.442*** 
(0.116) 
 
0.561*** 
(0.173) 
0.681*** 
(0.183) 
0.432*** 
(0.162) 
N
Üç
 -0.134*** 
(0.023) 
-0.163*** 
(0.032) 
-0.118*** 
(0.023) 
 
-0.127*** 
(0.023) 
-0.153*** 
(0.022) 
-0.103*** 
(0.021) 
N
Üç ? 5 -0.119
*** 
(0.034) 
-0.125*** 
(0.037) 
-0.106*** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.084*** 
(0.023) 
-0.119*** 
(0.027) 
-0.084** 
(0.027) 
LEVit-1 -0.074*** 
(0.022) 
-0.081*** 
(0.024) 
-0.064*** 
(0.021) 
 
-0.073*** 
(0.021) 
-0.085*** 
(0.023) 
-0.062*** 
(0.021) 
N
Üç
 × LEVit-
1 
-0.214*** 
(0.061) 
-0.283*** 
(0.064) 
-0.181*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.225*** 
(0.042) 
-0.284*** 
(0.046) 
-0.195*** 
(0.043) 
N
Üç ? 5  × 
LEVit-1 
-0.123*** 
(0.053) 
-0.142*** 
(0.055) 
-0.114*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.143*** 
(0.021) 
-0.164*** 
(0.027) 
-0.126*** 
(0.021) 
Crisist -0.037
*** 
(0.006) 
-0.046*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.005) 
    
CDSht-1     -0.001
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.253
*** 
(0.061) 
0.325*** 
(0.068) 
0.231*** 
(0.061) 
 
0.252*** 
(0.043) 
0.221*** 
(0.048) 
0.269*** 
(0.042) 
Xit-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Steady 
state 
-0.518*** 
(0.248) 
-0.807*** 
(0.365) 
-0.401*** 
(0.243) 
 
-0.481*** 
(0.164) 
-0.853*** 
(0.238) 
-0.329*** 
(0.129) 
N 1,134 682 452  451 279 172 
Sargan 
test 0.422 0.452 0.509  0.676 0.565 0.508 
AR (2) 0.266 0.379 0.361  0.361 0.404 0.340 
AR (3) 0.232 0.280 0.285  0.231 0.269 0.284 
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Table 9. The effects of the cost of capital (r it) on  µ P R G L I L H G ¶  O L T X L G L W \  F U H D W L R Q   / & ¶ it/TAit) 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the cost of capital (r it), defined by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶   U H T X L U H G 
return on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt), on 
liquidity creation. Quarterly observations for Eurozone listed banks are applied for all the specifications. The 
 G H S H Q G H Q W   Y D U L D E O H   L V   W K H   µ P R G L I L H G ¶   U D W L R   O L T X L G L W \   F U H D W L R Q   W R   W R W D O   D V V H W V    / & ¶  7 $ it). that includes the items 
 µ & X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V- F X U U H Q W ¶   D Q G   µ & X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V-  V D Y L Q J V ¶   D V   V H P L O L T X L G   O L D E L O L W L H V    D Q G   µ F X V W R P H U   G H S R V L W V-
 W H U P ¶  D Q G  µ ’ H S R V L W V  I U R P  E D Q N V ¶  D V  / L T X L G  O L D E L O L W L H V  Panel A includes the regression analysis the whole sample. 
Panel B includes the regression results for the post-crisis period. LEVit is measured as total assets over total equity. 
The variables Crisisit controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable which takes the value one after 
the beginning of the crisis (t             4        D Q G   ] H U R    R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years maturity sovereign Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). Values for CDS are available from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the 
 V S H F L I L F D W L R Q V  D U H  H V W L P D W H G  X V L Q J   W K H  $ U H O O D Q R  D Q G  % R Q G ¶ V           GMM. The set of instruments include t-2, t-3, 
and t-4 lagged variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate (UNEMPht) are included as 
exogenous variables. Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and serial 
correlation tests (p-values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect between the cost of capital and  / & ¶  7 $ it. 
All the variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) and (4) display the regression values for the whole sample, 
columns (2) and (5) for the periphery countries, and columns (3) and (6) for the core countries. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at 
the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 PANEL A: The whole period  
(2002Q1-2016Q4) 
 
PANEL B: The period after the crisis 
(2008Q1  – 2016Q4) 
 Eurozone Periphery Countries 
Core 
Countries  Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
(  / & ¶   
TA)it-1 
0.463*** 
(0.113) 
0.543*** 
(0.115) 
0.421*** 
(0.104) 
 
0.543*** 
(0.121) 
0.613*** 
(0.132) 
0.464*** 
(0.113) 
N
Üç
 -0.143*** 
(0.024) 
-0.183*** 
(0.029) 
-0.134*** 
(0.021) 
 
-0.127*** 
(0.023) 
-0.153*** 
(0.025) 
-0.117*** 
(0.022) 
N
Üç ? 5 -0.082
*** 
(0.015) 
-0.099*** 
(0.019) 
-0.065*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.085*** 
(0.013) 
-0.113*** 
(0.023) 
-0.072*** 
(0.021) 
LEVit-1 -0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.068*** 
(0.015) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.054*** 
(0.022) 
-0.078*** 
(0.023) 
-0.046** 
(0.020) 
N
Üç
 × LEVit-
1 
-0.153*** 
(0.035) 
-0.185*** 
(0.032) 
-0.141*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.143*** 
(0.021) 
-0.194*** 
(0.026) 
-0.114*** 
(0.021) 
N
Üç ? 5  × 
LEVit-1 
-0.093*** 
(0.023) 
-0.114*** 
(0.026) 
-0.078*** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.104*** 
(0.014) 
-0.116*** 
(0.018) 
-0.093*** 
(0.013) 
Crisist -0.031
*** 
(0.005) 
-0.034*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
    
CDSht-1     -0.001
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.231
*** 
(0.034) 
0.173*** 
(0.037) 
0.285*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.234*** 
(0.045) 
0.193** 
(0.046) 
0.283*** 
(0.042) 
Xit-1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Steady 
state 
-0.419*** 
(0.183) 
-0.617*** 
(0.239) 
-0.344*** 
(0.166) 
 
-0.464*** 
(0.229) 
-0.687*** 
(0.326) 
-0.353*** 
(0.173) 
N 1,134 682 452  451 279 172 
Sargan 
test 0.659 0.611 0.612  0.591 0.604 0.589 
AR (2) 0.466 0.433 0.357  0.361 0.363 0.225 
AR (3) 0.352 0.235 0.273  0.294 0.269 0.138 
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Table 10. Granger predictability test: Reverse causality 
This table provides the regression results of the Granger predictability test to study the reverse causality between 
the cost of capital (r it) defined by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶   U H T X L U H G   U H W X U Q on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-
free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt), and the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) calculated as 
impaired loans over total loans, credit supply (LOANTAit)  P H D V X U H G  D V  F X V W R P H U V ¶  O R D Q V  W R  W R W D O  D V V H W V  TAit) and 
liquidity creation (LCit/TAit) computed as 0.5 × (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities  – liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities 
 – equity) over TAit. Quarterly observations for Eurozone listed banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in all 
the specifications. The variable Crisisit controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable which takes 
the value one after the beginning of the crisis (t             4       D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   All the regressions are estimated 
 X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R   D Q G   % R Q G ¶ V              * 0 0    7 K H   V H W   R I   L Q V W U X P H Q W V   L Q F O X G H t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. 
Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-
values). All the variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. 
Estimated followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.   
 r it NPLit r it LOANTAit r it (LC/TA)it 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
yit-1 0.749*** 
(0.113) 
0.145 
(0.184) 
0.832*** 
(0.127) 
-0.642*** 
(0.113) 
0.770*** 
(0.083) 
-0.821*** 
(0.203) 
yit-2 0.542*** 
(0.045) 
0.131 
(0.256) 
0.524*** 
(0.064) 
-0.558*** 
(0.130) 
0.435*** 
(0.084) 
-0.612*** 
(0.131) 
yit-3 0.362*** 
(0.045) 
0.032 
(0.065) 
0.236*** 
(0.034) 
-0.425** 
(0.211) 
0.231*** 
(0.053) 
-0.421** 
(0.143) 
yit-4 0.241*** 
(0.024) 
0.027 
(0.231) 
0.127*** 
(0.053) 
-0.217** 
(0.103) 
0.148*** 
(0.041) 
-0.220*** 
(0.082) 
NPLit-1 0.135** 
(0.057) 
0.542*** 
(0.057) 
    
NPLit-2 0.081*** 
(0.006) 
0.462*** 
(0.037) 
    
NPLit-3 0.044* 
(0.031) 
0.327*** 
(0.015) 
    
NPLit-4 0.021* 
(0.014) 
0.151*** 
(0.024) 
    
LOANTAit-1   -0.134 
(0.374) 
0.542*** 
(0.074) 
  
LOANTAit-2   -0.085 
(0.237) 
0.335*** 
(0.058) 
  
LOANTAit-3   -0.073 
(0.143) 
0.164*** 
(0.023) 
  
LOANTAit-4   -0.042 
(0.093) 
0.099*** 
(0.021) 
  
(LC/TA)it-1     -0.005 
(0.013) 
0.428*** 
(0.064) 
(LC/TA)it-2     -0.016 
(0.169) 
0.253*** 
(0.079) 
(LC/TA)it-3     -0.019 
(0.084) 
0.183*** 
(0.042) 
(LC/TA)it-4     -0.011 
(0.053) 
0.121*** 
(0.040) 
Crisist 0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.064*** 
(0.011) 
-0.115*** 
(0.031) 
0.035*** 
(0.008) 
-0.084** 
(0.033) 
N 962 962 962 962 962 962 
Sargan test 0.685 0.487 0.582 0.518 0.357 0.664 
AR (2) 0.392 0.240 0.472 0.641 0.893 0.550 
AR (3) 0.288 0.148 0.272 0.445 0.646 0.217 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the NPLs ratio, Beta CAPM, the cost of capital and the profitability gap 
in the periphery countries and the core countries before (2002Q1-2007Q2) and after (2007Q3-
2016Q4) the crisis.  
           (a) Non-Performing Loans ratio (NPLit)                         (b) Beta CAPM ( it) 
 
                         (c) Cost of capital (r it)                             (d) Profitability gap (r it  – ROEit) 
 
Source:  $ X W K R U V ¶   H V W L P D W L R Q   E D V H G   R Q   7 K R P V R Q   5 H X W H U V   ’ D W D V W U H D P   D Q G   % D Q N V F R S H    7 K H   V R O L G   O L Q H 
represents the periphery countries, whilst the dashed line, the periphery countries. Subfigure (a) displays 
the evolution of the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) measured as the ration impaired loans to total 
loans, breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. 
Subfigure (b) displays the evolution of the Beta CAPM (  it) estimated as the covariance between the 
return of the stock i and the return of the market portfolio over the variance of the market portfolio 
return, breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. 
Subfigure (c) displays the evolution of the cost of capital (r it) defined by   L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q on 
bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt), 
breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. 
Subfigure (d) displays the evolution of the profitability gap (r it  – ROEit), the difference between 
 L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q  R Q  E D Q N  H T X L W \   r it , and  the return on bank equity ROEit, breaking the sample 
down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. The vertical line splits the 
sample before and after the crisis periods (t = 2007Q2).  
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Figure 2. Distribution of the NPLs ratio, Beta CAPM, the cost of capital and the profitability 
gap in the periphery countries and the core countries before (2002Q1-2007Q2) and after 
(2007Q3-2016Q4) the crisis.  
           (a) Non-Performing Loans ratio (NPLit)                         (b) Beta CAPM ( it) 
 
                         (c) Cost of capital (r it)                             (d) Profitability gap (r it  – ROEit) 
 
Source     $ X W K R U V ¶   H V W L P D W L R Q   E D V H G   R Q   7 K R P V R Q   5 H X W H U V   ’ D W D V W U H D P   D Q G   % D Q N V F R S H    7 K H   W H U P V  µ Core 
C ¶. and  µ Periphery C.  ¶ refers to core countries and periphery countries, respectively. Subfigure (a) 
displays the distribution of the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) measured as the ration impaired loans 
to total loans, breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery 
countries. Subfigure (b) displays the distribution of the Beta CAPM (  it) estimated as the covariance 
between the return of the stock i and the return of the market portfolio over the variance of the market 
portfolio return, breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery 
countries. Subfigure (c) displays the distribution of the cost of capital (r it)  G H I L Q H G  E \  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G 
return on bank equity computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium 
(ERPt), breaking the sample down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. 
Subfigure (d) displays the distribution of the profitability gap (r it  – ROEit), the difference between 
 L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q  R Q  E D Q N  H T X L W \   r it , and  the return on bank equity ROEit, breaking the sample 
down before and after the crisis, and then by core and periphery countries. The whiskers represent the 
maximum and the minimum of the distribution. The box is divided into two parts by the median, i.e., 
the 50 percent of the distribution. The upper (lower) box represents the 25 percent of the sample greater 
(lower) than the median, i.e., the upper (lower) quartile.  
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Appendix A 
A.1 Calculating bank market power: the Lerner index 
We use the Lerner index to control for the extent of competition in the European banking 
markets. The Lerner index measures the mark-up between the price and the marginal costs as 
a percentage of the price, thus indicating the degree of market power. The Lerner index ranges 
from zero to one ( .ANJAN
 Ü  ç
—: r Æs ; ); being .ANJAN
 Ü  ç
L s in case of perfect monopoly, and 
.ANJAN
 Ü  ç
L r  in case of perfect competition, and exceptionally .ANJAN
 Ü  ç
O r  in case of non-
optimal behaviour. The Lerner index is calculated as follows:   
.ANJAN
 Ü  ç
L
2
 Ü  ç
F / %
 Ü  ç
2
 Ü  ç
:
# ä s ;  
where 2
 Ü  ç
 is the ratio of interest income plus other operating income over total assets; and / %
 Ü  ç
 
represents the marginal costs as presented in Appendix A.2. 
 
A.2 Calculating the marginal costs 
The computation of the marginal costs ( / %
 Ü  ç
) necessary to compute the Lerner index is based 
on the following transcendental logarithmic costs function (see Birchwood et al., 2017; Carbó 
et al., 2017): 
  
:
%
 Ü  ç
;
L Ü
4 E Ü 5    : 6 #  Ü  ç ; E
Ü
6
t
:
  
:
6 #
 Ü  ç
; ; 6
E ˝ ö
Û
  
:
S
Û  Ü  ç
;
7
Û @5
E
s
t ˝ ˝ ö Û Þ   
:
S
Û  Ü  ç
;
H    : S
 Þ  Ü  ç
;
7
Þ @5
7
Û @5
E
s
t ˝ ß Û   
:
6 #
 Ü  ç
;
H    : S
Û  Ü  ç
;
7
Û @5
E ä
5 6NAJ@E ä 6
s
t 6NAJ@
6
E ä
7 6NAJ@H    : 6 #  Ü  ç ;
E ˝ â
Û
6NAJ@H    : S
Û  Ü  ç
;
7
Û @5
E    : Q
 Ü  ç
; :
# ä t ;
 
where Cit represents the total costs (including operating and financial costs), and wit the costs 
of inputs (labour, capital, and deposits). The variable Trend is included to control for 
technological changes over time. A system factor (share) equations is derived according to the 
 6 K H S K D U G ¶ V  O H P P D 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being I
Û  Ü  ç
 the costs share of factor h for bank i in period t.  
A.3 Liquidity classification of bank activities 
Assets 
Illiquid assets (weight = ½) Semiliquid assets (weight = 0) Liquid assets (weight = -½) 
Corporate commercial loans 
Investment in properties 
Foreclosed real estate 
Fixed assets 
Goodwill 
Other intangibles 
Other assets 
Residential mortgage loans 
Other mortgage loans 
Other consumer / retail loans 
Loans and advances to banks 
Reverse repos and cash collateral 
Cash and due from banks 
Trading securities and at FV through income 
Tradable derivatives 
Available for sale securities  
Held to maturity securities 
At-equity investment in associates 
Other securities 
Liabilities 
Liquid liabilities (weight = ½) Semiliquid liabilities (weight = 0) Illiquid liabilities (weight = -½) 
Customer deposits-current 
Customer deposits-savings 
Tradable derivatives 
Trading liabilities 
Customer deposits-term 
Deposits from banks 
Repos and cash collateral 
Other deposits and short-term borrowing 
Fair value proportion of debt 
Senior debt maturing after 1 year 
Subordinated borrowing 
Other funding 
Credit impairment reserves 
Reserves for pensions and others 
Current tax liabilities 
Deferred tax liabilities 
Other deferred liabilities 
Other liabilities 
Off-balance-sheet activities 
Illiquid activities (weight = ½) Semiliquid activities (weight = 0) Liquid activities (weight = -½) 
Acceptances and documentary credits reported 
Committed credit lines 
Other contingent liabilities 
Managed securitized assets reported off-balance 
sheet 
Other off-balance-sheet exposure to securitizations 
Guarantees 
 
Equity 
  Total equity (weight = -½) 
  Equity 
Notes: We follow Berger and Bowman (2009) to classify the on- and off- balance sheet items according to their liquidity status. See also Fu et al. (2006) for a similar approach. 
All the variables are obtained from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope.  
 
APPENDIX  B:  7 H V W L Q J  W K H  * H U P D Q  E D Q N V  I R U  µ I D O V H  S R V L W L Y H V ¶  D Q G 
 µ I D O V H  Q H J D W L Y H V ¶  
 
Table B1. The effects of NPLs on the cost of capital for a subsample of German banks. 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of NPLs on the cost of capital. The dependent variable is 
the cost of capital (r it)  G H I L Q H G  E \  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q  R Q  E D Q N  H T X L W \ which is computed as the return of the 
risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt). NPLit is measured as the ration impaired loans to total 
loans. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). LEVit is measured as total assets over 
total equity. Lernerit is computed as the price minus marginal costs over price. INCit is the non-interest income 
over total net income ratio. EFFit is calculated as the operating costs over gross income ratio. The variable Crisist 
controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable which takes the value one after the beginning of the 
crisis (t             4      D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at 
the country level (h). Values for CDS are available from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the specifications are estimated 
 X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R   D Q G   % R Q G ¶ V               * 0 0    7 K H   V H W   R I   L Q V W U X P H Q W V   L Q F O X G H V t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. 
Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate (UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. Instruments 
validity is tested using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-values). The 
steady state denotes the long-term effect between the cost of capital and the NPL ratio. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 
5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
r it-1 0.432*** 
(0.103) 
0.435*** 
(0.102) 
0.464*** 
(0.103) 
0.474*** 
(0.103) 
NPLit 0.053*** 
(0.010) 
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
0.054*** 
(0.013) 
0.056*** 
(0.014) 
NPLit-1 0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.032*** 
(0.013) 
0.042*** 
(0.018) 
LEVit-1  0.146*** 
(0.064) 
 0.142*** 
(0.063) 
LOANTAit-1  -0.162** 
(0.082) 
 -0.173** 
(0.078) 
Sizeit-1  0.124*** 
(0.043) 
 0.120*** 
(0.042) 
Lernerit-1  0.121*** 
(0.035) 
 0.123*** 
(0.037) 
INCit-1  -0.112** 
(0.034) 
 -0.116*** 
(0.036) 
EFFit-1  0.039** 
(0.012) 
 0.043*** 
(0.014) 
Crisist  0.014*** 
(0.006) 
 0.016*** 
(0.005) 
CDSht-1   0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
Steady state 0.153*** 
(0.067) 
0.188*** 
(0.085) 
0.160*** 
(0.074) 
0.186*** 
(0.064) 
     
N 185 185 115 115 
Sargan test 0.476 0.617 0.767 0.558 
AR (2) 0.625 0.744 0.697 0.566 
AR (3) 0.386 0.422 0.486 0.411 
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Table B2. The effects of the cost of capital and on credit supply for a subsample of German banks. 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the cost of capital on credit supply. The dependent 
variable is the ratio loans to customers to total assets (LOANTAit),  Z K L F K   L V   F D O F X O D W H G   D V   F X V W R P H U V ¶   O R D Q V   R Y H U 
total assets (TAit). The cost of capital (r it) is  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶   U H T X L U H G   U H W X U Q   R Q   E D Q N   H T X L W \ computed as the return of 
the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity risk premium (ERPt). Sizeit is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged 
total assets (TAit). LEVit is measured as total assets over total equity. Lernerit is computed as the price minus 
marginal costs over price. INCit is the non-interest income over total net income ratio. EFFit is calculated as the 
operating costs over gross income ratio. The variable Crisist controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy 
variable which takes the value one after the beginning of the crisis (t             4       D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 
10-years maturity sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). Values for CDS are available 
from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the  V S H F L I L F D W L R Q V   D U H   H V W L P D W H G   X V L Q J   W K H   $ U H O O D Q R   D Q G   % R Q G ¶ V                * 0 0    7 K H 
set of instruments includes t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate 
(UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect 
between LOANTAit and the cost of capital and the profitability gap, respectively. All the variables are defined in 
Table1. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the bank level. Estimated followed by *, **, *** are 
statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOANTAit-1 0.353*** 
(0.115) 
0.331*** 
(0.113) 
0.364*** 
(0.113) 
0.385*** 
(0.114) 
r it -0.083*** 
(0.015) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
-0.083*** 
(0.017) 
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
r it-1 -0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.049*** 
(0.012) 
-0.056*** 
(0.015) 
-0.046*** 
(0.011) 
LEVit-1 -0.105*** 
(0.024) 
-0.109*** 
(0.026) 
-0.095*** 
(0.019) 
-0.103*** 
(0.018) 
r it × LEV it-1  -0.134*** 
(0.028) 
 -0.123*** 
(0.026) 
r it-1 × LEV it-1  -0.121*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.124*** 
(0.018) 
Sizeit-1 -0.363*** 
(0.124) 
-0.353*** 
(0.121) 
-0.346*** 
(0.123) 
-0.352*** 
(0.127) 
Lernerit-1 -0.013*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013*** 
(0.006) 
INCit-1 -0.141*** 
(0.022) 
-0.134*** 
(0.020) 
-0.132*** 
(0.021) 
-0.131*** 
(0.022) 
EFFit-1 -0.063*** 
(0.021) 
-0.054*** 
(0.018) 
-0.065*** 
(0.020) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
Crisist -0.214*** 
(0.037) 
-0.232*** 
(0.042) 
  
CDSht-1   -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.215*** 
(0.060) 
0.217*** 
(0.056) 
0.205*** 
(0.053) 
0.201*** 
(0.053) 
Steady state -0.210*** 
(0.073) 
-0.182*** 
(0.084) 
-0.219*** 
(0.078) 
-0.197*** 
(0.082) 
     
N 185 185 115 115 
Sargan test 0.632 0.782 0.797 0.691 
AR (2) 0.501 0.620 0.596 0.624 
AR (3) 0.244 0.294 0.230 0.203 
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Table B3. The effects of the cost of capital on liquidity creation for a subsample of German 
banks. 
This table provides the regression results of the effects of the cost of capital (r it) on liquidity creation. The 
dependent variable is the ratio liquidity creation to total assets (LCit/TAit), which is calculated as 0.5 × (illiquid 
assets + liquid liabilities  – liquid assets  – illiquid liabilities  – equity) over total assets (TAit). ). The cost of capital 
(r it) is  L Q Y H V W R U V ¶  U H T X L U H G  U H W X U Q  R Q  E D Q N  H T X L W \ computed as the return of the risk-free asset plus  it  times equity 
risk premium (ERPt). Sizeit is the natural logarithm of one-period lagged total assets (TAit). LEVit is measured as 
total assets over total equity. Lernerit is computed as the price minus marginal costs over price. INCit is the non-
interest income over total net income ratio. EFFit is calculated as the operating costs over gross income ratio. The 
variable Crisist controls for the structural break, and it is a dummy variable which takes the value one after the 
beginning of the crisis (t          4      D Q G  ] H U R   R W K H U Z L V H   CDSht is the 10-years maturity sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) at the country level (h). Values for CDS are available from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4. All the specifications 
 D U H  H V W L P D W H G  X V L Q J  W K H  $ U H O O D Q R  D Q G  % R Q G ¶ V             * 0 0   7 K H  V H W  R I  L Q V W U X P H Q W V  L Q F O X G H V t-2, t-3, and t-4 lagged 
variables. Economic growth (GDPht) and unemployment rate (UNEMPht) are included as exogenous variables. 
Instruments validity is tested using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and serial correlation tests (p-
values). The steady state denotes the long-term effect between LCit/TAit and the cost of capital and the profitability 
gap, respectively. All the variables are defined in Table1. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the 
bank level. Estimated followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(LC / TA)it-1 0.375*** 
(0.063) 
0.356*** 
(0.067) 
0.376*** 
(0.073) 
0.363*** 
(0.065) 
r it -0.122*** 
(0.025) 
-0.121*** 
(0.024) 
-0.123*** 
(0.024) 
-0.123*** 
(0.028) 
r it-1 -0.082*** 
(0.021) 
-0.083*** 
(0.026) 
-0.084*** 
(0.023) 
-0.081*** 
(0.024) 
LEVit-1 -0.048** 
(0.019) 
-0.052** 
(0.019) 
-0.052** 
(0.016) 
-0.053** 
(0.018) 
r it × LEV it-1  -0.153*** 
(0.036) 
 -0.156*** 
(0.038) 
r it-1 × LEV it-1  -0.112*** 
(0.040) 
 -0.110*** 
(0.042) 
LOANTAit 0.264*** 
(0.023) 
0.259*** 
(0.029) 
0.2452** 
(0.023) 
0.246*** 
(0.022) 
Sizeit-1 0.130*** 
(0.021) 
0.123*** 
(0.018) 
0.131*** 
(0.020) 
0.126*** 
(0.017) 
Lernerit-1 0.012*** 
(0.007) 
0.010*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.011*** 
(0.005) 
INCit-1 0.122*** 
(0.017) 
0.117*** 
(0.014) 
0.122*** 
(0.016) 
0.116*** 
(0.014) 
EFFit-1 -0.026** 
(0.014) 
-0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.025** 
(0.013) 
-0.024*** 
(0.012) 
Crisist -0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.034*** 
(0.012) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
CDSht-1   -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Intercept 0.330*** 
(0.034) 
0.323*** 
(0.032) 
0.334*** 
(0.037) 
0.321*** 
(0.031) 
Steady state -0.326*** 
(0.148) 
-0.317*** 
(0.153) 
-0.332*** 
(0.142) 
-0.320*** 
(0.152) 
     
N 185 185 115 115 
Sargan test 0.525 0.630 0.585 0.610 
AR (2) 0.501 0.472 0.489 0.431 
AR (3) 0.302 0.303 0.333 0.294 
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